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The issue of whether a minister' has the right to refuse to
testify under oath relative to communication with a client2 is
not a recent one. With the first recorded case having taken
place under James I,' it is clear that the right of a minister to
refuse to testify was first questioned many centuries ago. In
the United States, a New York court first dealt with this issue
in 1813."
Despite the long history of the minister's privilege and its
early treatment in the United States, relatively few cases have
o 1983 by Jacob M. Yellin
*B.A. Brooklyn College, J.D. University of Santa Clara, LL.M. University of Cal-
ifornia at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). The author wishes to thank Professors Robert Peter-
son of the University of Santa Clara and Ronan Degnan of U.C. Berkeley for their
assistance with this project.
1. For the purposes of this paper the term "minister's privilege," "clergyman's
privilege," or simply "the privilege" all refer to the right of a clergyman of any de-
nomination to remain silent and refuse testimony. No denominational differentiation
is meant by the term "minister," unless used in combination with "priest," "rabbi,"
or unless specifically stated. Otherwise "minister" is here used as a generic term
meaning member of the clergy of any faith or religious community. Priest is meant to
indicate, unless otherwise stated, an ordained clergyman of the Catholic faith. Simi-
larly "rabbi" is used, unless otherwise stated, as a term meaning an ordained clergy-
man of the Jewish faith. The privilege of a clergyman not to testify about privileged
communications has been known by different names throughout its history. The priv-
ilege has been called "priest-penitent," "confessor," "clergyman's," "minister's," etc.
Also, the use of the masculine gender (i.e., clergyman) is not meant to indicate
reference to only a male. There are, of course, many female members of the clergy in
various denominations. Rather the use of the masculine gender is used for conve-
nience and ease of syntax, especially since all the privilege statutes in the United
States (with the exception of Kansas) use that gender. Statements, however, are
meant to apply to female members of the clergy as well.
2. Client and penitent will be used interchangeably in this paper.
3. Trial of Henry Garnet, 2 Howell's State Trials 218 (1606).
4. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813). (This case was not officially
reported, but an "editor's report" of the case is abstracted in 1 W. L.J. 109 (1843),
quoted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 198 (1955). [here-
inafter cited as Privileged Communications]).
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considered it. Thus, for example, a review of the American,
Decennial, and General Digests6 from 1658 through 1980
reveals that there exist approximately seventy reported cases
on the privilege. Compare that figure to the approximately
122 reported cases in California alone through 1963 on the at-
torney-client privilege,6 and it is clear that the minister's priv-
ilege has not been the subject of extensive appellate litigation.
This article will trace the history of the minister's privi-
lege through the common law and in the United States. It will
then consider the development of this privilege in the United
States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the pol-
icy of the privilege; and the statutory status of the privilege in
the various states. The limits of the clergyman's right to re-
fuse testimony regarding private communications, as well as
the varied and specific requirements for the privilege to be
invoked in the various jurisdictions, will then be considered.
Finally, various factors will be analyzed among the differ-
ent statutory formulations for the clergy privilege, and a rec-
ommended model statute will be proposed. This article will
not consider the constitutionality of the minister's privilege
although the constitutional implications of various require-
ments may be generally discussed. While the entire issue of
the constitutionality of the privilege is an interesting and ab-
sorbing subject, it is not within the scope of this article.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE MINISTER'S PRIVILEGE BEFORE THE
REFORMATION
In considering the common law history of the minister's
privilege, a distinction must be made between the period
before the Protestant Reformation and the period after it.
5. 50 AM. DIo. Witnesses § 777 (Century ed. 1904); 20 AM. DIo. Witnesses § 215
(Decennial ed. 1910); 23 AM. DIG. Witnesses § 215 (2d Decennial ed. 1922); 28 THIRD
DECENNIAL DIG. Witnesses § 215 (1938); FIFTH DECENNIAL DIG. Witnesses § 215
(1949); SIXTH DECENNIAL DIG. Witnesses § 215 (1958); SEVENTH DECENNIAL DIG. Wit-
nesses § 215 (1968); EIGHTH DECENNIAL DIG. Witnesses § 215 (1978); 1 WEST'S GEN.
DIG. Witnesses § 215 (Fifth Ser. 1977); 3 id. at § 215; 4 id. at § 215; 9 id. at § 215; 10
id. at § 215; 11 id. at § 215; 17 id. at § 215 (Fifth Ser. 1980); 18 id. at § 215; 23 id. at
§ 215; 26 id. at § 215 (Fifth Ser. 1981).
6. CAL. DIG. §§ 199-206 (West 1963).
7. For an in depth, though somewhat dated, discussion of the constitutional
ramifications of the privilege, see Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of
the Priest-Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 27 (1967).
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The privilege as it developed before the Reformation will be
first considered.
The roots of the minister's privilege can be traced to the
dictates of the early Christian Church which required that pa-
rishioners regularly confess their misdeeds to a priest." Histor-
ical records accurately demonstrate that the courts of England
were greatly influenced by common law and were staffed by
bishops and clerics, so that there is little doubt of the congru-
ence of early common law and church law.9
Early legal records in Anglo-Saxon England prior to the
Norman conquest do not specifically delineate the privilege of
a priest to keep matters of the confessional confidential. Yet
these records do clearly recognize the merit of confession. The
Anglo-Saxon laws of Edward the Elder (921-24), son of Alfred
the Great, state: "And if a man guilty of death . . .desires
confession let it never be denied him."10 The secular laws of
King Canute (1017-35) repeat the identical provision." King
Ethelied, who preceded King Canute, proclaimed a similar
provision in his laws: "And let every Christian man do as is
needful to him: let him strictly keep his Christianity and ac-
custom himself frequently to [confess]: and fearlessly confess
his sins. 1 2 Thus, the desirability of confession was recognized
8. The early Christian church cells were comprised of small groups of
people who met regularly-often secretly. The order of worship was,
first of all, self-disclosure and confession of sin, called exomologesis.
This was followed by appropriate announcement of penance, pleas for
forgiveness, and plans for making restitution. A final period of friendly
fellowship (koinonia) closed the meeting. This general formula contin-
ued until the Council of Nicea, A.D. 325, when Constantine took over
the church for all Roman citizens. To make it acceptable, however, he
replaced the requirement of open personal disclosure with private con-
fession to a priest. Private confession to a priest at least once a year was
... obligatory in the thirteenth century. Luther dispensed with closed
confession for Protestants; the Catholics continued it.
D. Jones, Privileged Communications with Clergy in the United States-An Analyti-
cal Study of the Laws of Each State, Territory and Protectorate Concerning Such
Privileged Communications (April 16, 1879) (unpublished Doctor of Ministry thesis
available in San Francisco Theological Seminary Library) (quoting K. MENNINGER,
WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN?, at 25-26 (1973)).
9. Nolan, The Law of the Seal of the Confession, 13 CATH. ENCYCL. 649, 652(1913), construed in Hogan, A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional,
6 Loy. L. REv. 1, S (1951).
10. Nolan, supra note 9, at 649, quoted in W. TEMANN, THE RIGHT To SILENCE,
at 35 (1964).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 36.
1983]
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very early in English history. While there is no provision dic-
tating that the confession and its secrecy be honored by the
court, it is reasonable to conclude that secular law so held,
given the close relationship between canon and common law. s
After the Norman Conquest in 1066, the English councils
continued to express their approval of the inviolability of con-
fessions. The following passage is from the laws of Henry 1
(1100-35):
Priests should guard that they not reveal to acquaint-
ances or strangers what has been confessed to them by
those who come for confession; for if they do it, even in
good faith, they will be sentenced to live all the days of
their life as an honorless pilgrim. '
Canons which recognize the secrecy of the confession are also
found in the provincial canons of Oxford held in 1222 and in
the twenty-first canon of the Lateran Council, declared in
1215.1' Since, as stated previously, the common law reflected
the laws of the Church it is certain that the secrecy of confes-
sion was recognized by English law after the Norman
Conquest.
[But this] recognition [of the secrecy of the confession]
would not have rested on any principle of immunity from
disclosure of confidential communications made to clergy-
men. It would have rested on the fact that confession was
a sacrament, that the doctrine of the Church laid it down
13. As one author notes:
The very close connexion [sic] between the religion of the Anglo-Saxons
and their laws, many of which are purely ordinances of religious obser-
vance enacted by the State, the repeated recognition of the supreme ju-
risdiction of the pope, and the various instances of the application in the
Church of England of the laws of the Church in general lead conclu-
sively to the opinion that the ecclesiastical law of the secrecy of confes-
sion was recognized by the law of the land in Anglo-Saxon England.
Nolan, supra note 9, at 649.
14. 2 W. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 991 (2d ed. 1882).
[hereinafter cited as BEST ON EVIDENCE]. Quoted in W. TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 36.
Similarly, in 1220, the Council of Durham declared:
A priest shall not reveal a confession-let none dare from anger or
hatred or fear of the Church or of death, in any way to reveal confes-
sions, by sign or word, general or special, as [for instance], by saying, "I
know what manner of men ye are," under peril of his Order and Bene-
fice, and if he shall be convicted thereof he shall be degraded without
mercy.
Nolan, supra note 9, at 650.
15. Nolan, supra note 9, at 649, construed in TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 37.
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as a necessity, that both king and people practiced it in
some degree of faithfulness and that the practice was
wholly a matter of spiritual discipline on which the
church had declared the law of absolute secrecy."0
An Irish court decision in 194517 reviewed the history of the
minister's privilege and concluded: "I have no doubt the seal
of the confessional was respected in the courts of England
before the Reformation . . . and its recognition before the
Norman Conquest seems to be proved."18
There also exists an old statute which involved the minis-
ter's privilege. The Articuli Cler 9 is the first known statute
to deal with this privilege, and the only recorded statute of
the English Parliament on this topic. It was enacted in 1315
during the reign of Edward II. Part of the statute reads: "It
also pleases our Lord the King that felons and approvers be
able to confess their misdeeds to the priest .. ."1o This stat-
ute is occasionally referred to by contemporary commentators
as proof that English parliamentary law recognized the invio-
lability of the Confessional. The true meaning of the statute,
however, is uncertain and furnishes no concrete evidence on
the privilege itself.21
There is, however, an English case, decided before the
Reformation, which seems to indicate that the minister's priv-
ilege did not exist in that period. In Garnet's Case,12 Father
Garnet had been the spiritual adviser to Guy Fawkes and
others allegedly involved in the infamous gunpowder plot to
assassinate James I. The plot failed and Father Garnet, called
to testify regarding his knowledge of the plot, refused to give
any information on any conversations which he may have had
16. Nolan, supra note 9, at 650.
17. Cook v. Carroll, 1945 Ir. R. 515.
18. Id. at 517.
19. Articuli Cleri § 9, ch. 10 (Edw. II 1315) quoted in 2 BEST ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 14, § 584 (J. Morgan ed. 1876Y, also quoted in Hogan supra, note 9, at 9.
20. 2 BEST ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, at § 584 (J. Morgan ed. 1876) cited in
Hogan, supra note 9, at 9.
21. Best suggests that the statute does not refer to privileged communications,
but is simply a warning not to advise felons who have taken sanctuary within a
church of what is transpiring outside that church. BEST ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, §584 (J. Morgan ed. 1876) construed in Nolan, supra note 9, at 652, quoted in Hogan,
supra note 9, at 9. Wigmore calls it: "a statute ... of ambiguous purport." 8 J. WIo-
MORE, WI MORE ON EVIDENCE § 2394, at 869 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
22. 2 Howell's State Trials 218 (1606).
1-4 7 1,-:1 r10 1
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with the conspirators. Father Garnet was tried"' and com-
manded by the court to disclose any knowledge of the matter
which he possessed. Garnet refused, denying even to state
whether the knowledge of the matter which he possessed had
been garnered through the confession or outside of it. He was
tried and found guilty by the jury, after only fifteen minutes
deliberation, of "having knowledge of a treasonous plot with-
out disclosing it, though not participating in the plot or ap-
proving it."' "2 Father Garnet is now considered by the church
to be a martyr of the seal of the confession.2 5 This would then
seem to suggest that the English court did not recognize the
clergy privilege.
The value of Garnet's Case in demonstrating that there
was no pre-Reformation privilege is open to question however.
Wigmore quotes a different version of Garnet's Case:
[T]he [Earl of Nottingham asked him if one confessed
this day to him, that to-morrow [sic] morning if he must
conceal it. Whereupon Garnet answered that he must
conceal it, but the questioners did not attempt to compel
a disclosure of the confessional's secrets.2
In addition, Sir Edward Coke maintained that the privilege
did exist in pre-Reformation England, but did not apply in
the case of treason.27 It is therefore possible that, even if Gar-
net was held in contempt for failing to reveal confidential in-
formation, this was so only because the offense involved was
indeed treason. It also follows then that the privilege could
well have existed in instances when treason was not involved.
It is therefore difficult to conclude much about the minister's
privilege from Garnet's Case despite all the attention afforded
it by legal writers. What remains, however, is a virtual consen-
sus of opinion that the clergy privilege did exist in England
23. Probably for misprision of treason, although it is unclear from the case
itself.
24. Hogan, supra note 9, at 11-12 (citing 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 10, § 8 (1554); 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *119.
25. Hogan, supra note 9, at 11 (citing Pollen, Garnet, 6 CATH. ENCYCL. 386
(1913)).
26. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2394, at 869 n.1 (McNaughten rev.
1961).
27. "And so it was resolved in the case of Henry Garnet .. . superior of the
Jesuits in England, who would have shadowed his treason under the privilege of con-
fession. . . ." 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *629, quoted in 2 BEST ON EVIDENCE supra note




III. THE PRIVILEGE IN ENGLAND AFTER THE REFORMATION
While the privilege may have existed in the common law
of England before the Reformation, the virtually unanimous
opinion is that the privilege ceased to exist after the Reforma-
tion.28 To understand the reason for this shift it is necessary
to analyze the Anglican Church's position on confession, and
the religious transformation in England in the fifteenth
century.
During the fifteenth century a shift in England occurred
between the predominant Roman Catholic faith and the still
nascent but fast growing Anglican Church. Initially, the
Anglican Church recognized, at least by implication, the seal
of confession. The Communion Office of the Anglican Church
contained these words:
And if there be any of you whose conscience is troub-led or grieved in anything, lacking comfort or counsel, let
him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned
priest, taught in the law of God, and confess and open hisgrief secretly, that he may receive such ghostly counsel,
advice and comfort, that his conscience may be relieved,
and that of us (as of the ministers of God and of the
Church) he may receive comfort and absolution, to the
satisfaction of his mind, and avoiding of all scruple or
doubtfulness."'
Thus, confession still existed in the Anglican Church but was
now voluntary and not compulsory.8 0 If the penitent chose to
make confession, however, he was still assured that such con-
fession would be protected by the minister's privilege.31
28. See Note, Evidence: "Is There a Time to Keep Silence?"-The Priest-Peni-
tent Privilege in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 258 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note,
"Is There a Time to Keep Silence?"].
29. J. McNEILL, A HISTORY OF THE CuRw OF SouLs 220 (1951), quoted in TIE-
MANN, supra note 10, at 43.
30. W. TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 43.
31. Id. Best wrote:
It follows, then, that not only was there nothing in the change
which took place at the Reformation to alter the case as to the privilege
attaching to confession, but that there was, on the contrary, an express
recognition of it by statute. For of course the recognition of confession
implies, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the recognition of its
secrecy, because such was the common law rule; and if it were otherwise,
19831
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The importance of the confession in the Anglican Church
gradually began to diminish. In canon 113 of the Anglican ca-
nons of 1603, the sacrament of confession is afforded inviola-
bility, but an exception was made. Where the crime was so
serious that even knowledge of it by another person made that
other person subject to capital punishment if he did not re-
veal it, the privilege ceased.32
As the Anglican Church rose in prominence and became,
after the Reformation, the pre-eminent church in England,
the rite of confession became diminished in importance. Au-
ricular confessions, as has been previously stated, became vol-
untary and less frequent.33 It is therefore concluded by some
writers that the Reformation and the commensurate rise of
Protestantism in England, resulted in the loss of the minis-
ter's privilege. 4
Others believe, however, that the privilege continued to
exist for some years after the Reformation. Wigmore, for ex-
ample, concludes that only after the restoration of the monar-
chy in 1660, was the privilege no longer recognized. 3 Black-
no one would be likely to confess, and therefore the directions to the
Anglican clergy, to exhort their penitents to confess, would be idle and
futile.
175 Eng. Rep. 935 (1930) (citing 1 BEST ON EVIDENCE supra note 14, § 596 (J. Morgan
ed. 1876)), noted in W. TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 44.
32. Canon 113 provides in part:
Provided always, [tihat if any man confess his secret and hidden
sins to the minister, for the unburdening of his conscience, and to re-
ceive spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him: we do not in any
.way bind the said minister by this our Constitution, but do strictly
charge and admonish him, that he do not at any time reveal and make
known to any person whatsoever any crime or offense so committed to
his trust and secrecy (except they be such crimes as by the laws of this
realm his own life may be called in question for concealing the same)
under pain of irregularity.
Nolan, supra note 9, at 655 (quoting Protestant Church of England Canon 113
(1603)) (emphasis added).
33. D. Jones, supra note 8, at 9.
34. For example, Douglas Jones states:
For Protestants one of the results of the Reformation was the elimi-
nation of the requirement for private confessions before a priest, though
Protestants stress that no Christian is excused from the Biblical require-
ment to confess one's sins to God. As England gradually became
predominantly Protestant, her converts also gradually drifted away from
strong Catholic influence, and one of the major changes regarding the
clergy was the loss of the priest-penitent privilege.
Id. at 11.
35. "But since the Restoration, and for more than two centuries of English
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stone, in his classic commentary on the common law, makes
no mention of the minister's privilege." What is certain is
that at least after the Reformation the common law of Eng-
land no longer recognized the minister's privilege. There is in
fact a long line of British cases which deny the privilege. In1693 Lord Chief Justice Holt implied that while communica-
tion with an attorney or scrivner is privileged, conversation
with a parson is not.3 7 In Wilson v. Rastall s J. Buller stated:
"I take the distinction to be now well settled, that the privi-
lege extends to those three enumerated cases [of counsel, so-
licitor, and attorney] at all times, but that it is confined to
these cases only."3 9
In R. v. Hay, a priest refused to reveal the identity of a
person from whom he had received a watch alleged to have
been stolen. J. Hill sentenced the witness for contempt, deny-
ing the existence of any privilege. In Normanshaw v. Norman-
shaw,41 an action for divorce on the grounds of adultery, a
Vicar refused to disclose the substance of an admission made
to him. The court stated that each case must be judged on its
merits, but "it was not to be supposed for a single moment
that a clergyman had any right to withhold information from
a court of law."42 In addition, other post-Reformation cases
have denied the privilege. 3
Thus, there seems little doubt that a minister in post-
Reformation England did not have a privilege against testify-
ing. In present day England the law remains that a minister
has no right to refuse disclosure of confidential communica-
tions: "Confessions made to a minister of religion under the
seal of secrecy are not privileged from disclosure.'" The privi-
practice, the almost unanimous expression of judicial opinion (including at least twodecisive rulings) has denied the existence of the privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2394 at 869 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
36. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370.
37. See Anonymous 90 Eng. Rep. 179-80 (K.B. 1693).
38. 100 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1792).
39. Id. at 1287 quoted and construed in 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
2394, at 869 n.4 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
40. 175 Eng. Rep. 933 (Assizes 1860).
41. 69 L.T.R. (n.s.) 468 (P.D. & A. 1893).
42. Id. quoted and construed in 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2384,
at 869-70 n.4 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
43. See 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2384 at 869 n.4 (McNaughten
rev. 1961) for an extensive listing of English cases which have denied the privilege.
44. II HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 464 (4th ed. 1973).
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lege, however, has long been recognized by statute on the con-
tinent. 1 Typical of such statutes is the Austrian one which, as
amended, reads: "The following persons must not be ex-
amined as witnesses, lest their testimony be void: 1) ministers
in regard to facts that were communicated to them either dur-
ing confession or under the seal of secrecy."" Other European
countries also recognize the minister's privilege.' 7 Various
countries have, however, afforded differing treatment to the
privilege, so that no definite pattern can be discerned."
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINISTER'S PRIVILEGE IN THE
U.S.
The first case in the United States which dealt with the
minister's privilege was People v. Phillips, decided in 1813 by
the New York Court of General Sessions."' Phillips, charged
with recovering stolen goods, testified under oath that he had
made restitution of the property to his pastor. When the pas-
tor was called to testify he refused, stating that: "All his
knowledge respecting this investigation, is derived from his
functions as a minister of the Roman Catholic Church, in the
administration of penance, one of their seven sacraments; and
45. Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57
(1963).
46. Id. at 57 n.9 (quoting Austrian C.P.P. Civ. § 151 (1873)).
47. See, e.g., German S.T.R.O. Art. 53 § 1; German C. Pr. Civ. Art. 383; Ital.
C.P.C. § 249 (1977).
48. An interesting and unusual application of the minister's privilege, which de-
veloped in medieval France, is worth noting here. While the writer is unable to deter-
mine the precise details of this privilege, called the moniterre, it was in essence a
process of obtaining information helpful in solving crimes, while simultaneously pro-
tecting confidential sources. When a serious crime would be committed in a French
village, the local priest would announce in church the nature of the crime, and solicit
witnesses to the event. These witnesses, who could perhaps provide useful informa-
tion to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime, would give this information to the
priest in the confessional. The priest would then transmit it to the local constabulary,
omitting the identity of the informer. Thus valuable information could be provided to
the police without jeopardizing the source of the information and also protecting the
minister's privilege. This was a unique application of the minister's privilege in that it
served to facilitate disclosure of information, rather than the usual process in which
disclosure is inhibited. (The moniterre was orally described to the writer by B.
Schwatzbach, Professor of French Literature at Brooklyn College, in New York, N.Y.
It is also described in SIMON, DICTIONAIRRE DES SCIENCE ECCLESSIASTIQUES (1960), a
copy of which was not available to the writer).
49. This case was not officially reported, but an "editor's report" of the case is
abstracted in 1 W. L.J. 109 (1843), quoted in Privileged Communications, supra note
4, at 199.
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that he is bound by the canons of his church, and by the obli-
gations of his clerical office, to the most inviolable se-
crecy. . . ...0 The court concluded that a priest should not be
compelled to reveal that which he had heard in the adminis-
tration of the sacrament of Penance."
Interestingly, the Phillips court did not base its holding
on policy grounds, i.e., it is in the public interest to encourage
confidential communications between clergymen and client.
Rather, the court concluded that forcing a priest to violate the
secrecy of the confessional would violate the free exercise of
religion.52 The Phillips court suggested that since a Catholic
priest, rather than a clergyman of any other denomination,
was involved, forcing him to violate his sacramental confes-
sional would violate his religious liberties."
Four years later, however, another New York court de-
50. Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 200.
51. Id. at 201.
52. The exact words of the court illustrate its deep concern for the affect on the
free exercise of religion which denying the privilege would effect:
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances
should be administered-that its ceremonies as well as its essentials
should be protected. The sacraments of a religion are its most important
elements. . . . Secrecy is of the essence of penance. The sinner will not
confess, nor will the priest receive his confession, if the veil of secrecy is
removed: To decide that the minister shall promulgate what he receives
in confession, is to declare that there shall be no penance; and this im-
portant branch of the Roman Catholic religion would be thus
annihilated.
Id. at 207.
53. Id. The Phillips Court examined the history of the privilege in England at
common law, and inter alia its status in Ireland. The court declared itself "shocked"
by the denial of the privilege to priests in England. It found that Catholic history inIreland was "unfortunate", and concluded that Irish law could be of no influence on
American law, where Catholics were involved:
The Catholic has been disenfranchised of his civil rights, deprived of his
inheritance, and excluded from the common rights of man; statute has
been passed upon statute, and adjudication has been piled upon adjudi-
cation in prejudice of his religious freedom. The benign spirit of toler-
ance, and the maxims of an enlightened policy, have recently amelio-
rated his condition, and will undoubtedly, in process of time, place him
on the same footing with his Protestant brethren; but until he stands
upon the broad pedestal of equal rights, emancipated from the most un-just thraldom we cannot but look with a jealous eye upon all decisions
which fetter him or rivet his chains.
Id. at 206. It is difficult to determine from the this discussion whether the privilege
would have applied had the clergyman been Protestant. Indeed the court appeared tobe more concerned with avoiding the persecution of Catholics than with applying the
laws of evidence.
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nied the existence of the privilege. In People v. Smith,84 the
defendant was charged with murder, and his minister was
called to testify regarding "certain confessions made by the
prisoner to him while confined in the prison in this village."'5
The court distinguished Phillips by stating that there the
minister was a Catholic priest bound to the rules of the Cath-
olic church.5" The Smith court concluded that in the case at
hand, however, the minister was Protestant and thus not
bound by the seal of the confessional. It then ordered him to
testify. 7
Partially in reaction to Smith the New York State legisla-
ture enacted the first statute in the United States dealing
with the minister's privilege. The statute read: "No minister
of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall
be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his pro-
fessional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the
rules or practice of such denomination."" This statute, al-
54. N.Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817). Not officially reported, but an "editor's re-
port" of the case is quoted in Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 209.
55. Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 210.
56. The court stated:
By the established canons, or ordinances of that church, confessions
are to be made by the members, at least once a year, to the priest, in
private; . . . According to the rules and ordinances of the church, the
priest is forbidden to divulge these confessions; and the witness declared
that no consideration whatsoever, not even the most severe punishment,
would induce him to depart from the established ordinances of the
church.
Id. at 211 n.2.
57. Id. at 211. In an ironic end to this case, the minister did testify for the
prosecution. The defendant was nevertheless found not guilty. The judge then ad-
monished the defendant:
[N]otwithstanding their verdict, I consider you . . . a guilty man. Upon
an ancient grudge you considered yourself justified in doing what you
have done; and the jury have [sic], I fear, confirmed your false and fatal
judgment. But, beware-you have not yet escaped. Believe me, your
most awful trial is yet to come. You are now an old man, and your days
must be few in this world, and you will shortly be compelled to appear
before another court, where there is no jury but God himself-Unless.
you repent, and devote your future life to humble atonement of your
guilt, your condemnation . . . is certain.
Id. at 212 (emphasis added). One can only assume, since the defendant's prior "con-
fession" resulted in testimony against him at trial, that the judge was suggesting a
"private" atonement in the future. Or perhaps the judge would have preferred, based
on his differentiation between Catholic and Protestant clergymen, that the defendant
become wiser, and limit his future confessions to Catholic priests.
58. N.Y. REv. STAT. § 72, pt. 3, ch. VII, tit. III, art. 8 (1828) (since amended)
cited in Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 213.
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though poorly drafted, nevertheless greatly influenced the
drafting of minister's privilege statutes in many states. 9
In 1875, the United States Supreme Court considered the
unrelated matter of whether the government was bound to a
contract for confidential services made during war time. 0 The
government argued that allowing the suit to be tried would
result in disclosure of national secrets which would seriously
damage the national security. The court then stated that pub-
lic policy would forbid the maintenance of any suit, if such
suit would "inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which
the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it
will not allow the confidence to be violated.""1
In dictum the Court continued: "On this principle, suits
cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the
confidence of the confessional . . .. ,"" While such dictum
cannot, of course, be construed as establishing a conclusive
precedent, it does indicate, however, that this country's high-
est court looked with favor upon the minister's privilege. This
recognition was being accomplished in the general absence of
statute, and despite the general notion at the time that such a
privilege did not exist at common law.
The privilege was not, however, recognized in all circum-
stances. In People v. Gates" it was held that statements made
to a clergyman were not privileged if they were not made to
him in his professional character. Similarly in Commonwealth
v. Drake" a defendant's penitential communication made to
other members of his church was held not privileged."
When the privilege was denied to clergymen they were
often compelled to testify despite personal, moral, and reli-
gious objections. As a result, pressure began to be exerted by
religious groups on the legislatures of many states to enact
statutes authorizing a minister's privilege. By 1955 thirty
59. Reese, supra note 45, at 57.
60. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
61. Id. at 107.
62. Id.
63. 13 Wend. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
64. 15 Mass. 161 (1818).
65. There are only a very limited number of nineteenth century cases dealing
with the privilege. Such cases that this writer has been able to identify are In re
Toome's Estate, 54 Cal. 509 (1880); State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N.W. 277 (1895);
Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881); Gilloley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877); Dahlev v.
State, 22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N.E. 850 (1899).
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states had enacted such statutes,"" while Pennsylvania seemed
to recognize the privilege without benefit of statute.7 From
1955 to 1963 fourteen more states enacted minister's privilege
statutes. Today forty-six states and the District of Columbia
have enacted such statutes, with Alabama and New Hamp-
shire having enacted them in 1979,68 and Pennsylvania, Illi-
nois, and Hawaii having recently repealed their statutes.
V. THE POLICY OF THE PRIVILEGE
The general legal notion is that, for the adversary process
to be most effective, it is vital that the legal inquisitor have
the right to obtain testimonial evidence from all sources. Thus
every person possessing the capacity to understand the nature
and obligation of an oath may be properly called upon to tes-
tify in all matters.6 9 Our legal system has, however, recognized
66. Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 213. Note that it is unclear
whether West Virginia's statute provides a privilege or not. See W. VA. CODE § 50-5-5
(1980).
67. Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 213 n.6 (citing In re Shaeffer's
Estate, 52 Dauphin Co. Reports 45 (Pa. 1942)) (although the Shaeffer court denied
the privilege, it implied that communications which were penitential in nature would
be accorded the privilege).
68. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EvID. 506
(1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001,
Rule 505 (1979); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (Supp. 1982); DEL. R. OF CT., R. OF
EVID. 505 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1982); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1982); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:477 (West 1981); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EviD. 505 (1982); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1982);
MIC. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1982);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon 1952);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.255 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-506 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R.
EVID. 505 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2505 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23
(1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-
13-16 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1606 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060 (Supp. 1982); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-
101 (1977).
69. Reese, supra note 45, at 56. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West
Supp. 1982).
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two classes of witnesses that are excluded from the obligation
to give testimony.
The first class is composed of those, who, because of
tender age, or deficient mental faculties, are considered in-
competent and are thus deemed not qualified to testify. The
second class is composed of those who because of privilege are
not permitted-or, alternatively, not required-to testify.7 0
Examples of such privileged persons are psychotherapists, at-
torneys, spouses and physicians.7 ' The legal system has con-
cluded that it is improper to compel the testimony of such
individuals, despite the potential hindrance to the adjudica-
tory process.72
Privileged communication between a minister and a cli-
ent, as has been previously stated, is now recognized by stat-
ute in forty-seven states. There have been various reasons
proposed for conferring a privileged status on this type of
communication. First, it is often stated that protecting the
privacy of the conversation between minister and penitent is
in the general interests of society. By encouraging people who
are burdened with feelings of guilt or remorse to reveal their
inner thoughts to a person of God we facilitate "socially desir-
able confidential relationships. ' '17 It follows, therefore, that
not recognizing this privilege would result in potential
penitents, aware of the possible disclosure of their misdeeds,
refraining from consulting clergymen for spiritual guidance.
The result would then be that society as a whole would suffer
by losing the benefits of spiritual confidence and counsel of
70. Reese, supra note 45, at 56.
71. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 980, 1014 (West 1966); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 954,
994, 1014 (West Supp. 1982).
72. As one commentator notes:
It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently is of
European law and is generally in western society, that whatever handi-
capping of the adjudicatory process is caused by recognition of the privi-
leges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain communica-
tive relations ...
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Courts
Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956).
73. Ponder, Will Your Pastor Tell?, LIBERTY, May-June, 1978, at 2, 3. See also
the preamble to the statute conferring the minister's privilege in Mississippi:
"Whereas, the emotional, mental and spiritual health of many of our citizens de-pends upon the free and confidential access to their clergymen or spiritual advisers;
Now, therefore, [B]e it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi." (em-
phasis added) Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982).
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the clergyman. 7'
Another reason for according ministers the privilege is
that we are, in fact, recognizing the inevitable, that ministers
will refuse to testify, despite the potential punitive sanctions
the court may impose. Members of the clergy, it is asserted,
would rather risk the punitive powers of the courts than disre-
gard basic religious doctrines, which may result in greater
punishment, albeit perhaps only of the spiritual variety:
Generally ministers will not testify, regardless of what the
trial judge says or does to them.
The Catholic priest, for example, would be subject to
excommunication for breaking the seal of the confes-
sional. From this viewpoint, the court's penalty is to be
preferred to his church's penalty. Many Protestant de-
nominations take an equally dim view of ministers who
violate confidentiality. 75
It follows, therefore, that the courts cannot, in effect,
74. This was perhaps most eloquently expressed in People v. Phillips:
[Wihen a man under the agonies of an afflicted conscience and the dis-
quietudes of a perturbed mind, applies to a minister of the Almighty,
lays bare his bosom filled with guilt, and opens his heart black with
crime, and solicits from him advice and consolation, in this hour of peni-
tence and remorse, and when this confession and disclosure may be fol-
lowed by the most salutary effects upon the religious principles and fu-
ture conduct of the penitent, and may open to him prospects which may
bless the remnant of his life, with the soul's calm sunshine and the
heart-felt joy, without interfering with the interests of society, surely the
establishment of a rule throwing all these pleasure prospects into shade,
and prostrating the relation between the penitent and the comforter,
between the votary and the minister of religion, must be pronounced a
heresy in our legal code.
Unreported case reprinted in Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 204.
This writer found it fascinating that Reese, in his seminal article on the minis-
ter's privilege, proposes this "societal benefit" theory as a valid reason for the exis-
tence of the privilege. Yet he states:
On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the needs of the individual
would be carried so far as to extend it to the well-known Negro group
which call themselves "Muslims," even though they might refer to their
organization as a church. Very few people would want a statute that
would extend the privilege to some of the pietistic groups who have re-
vived the pattern of early church life, in which the gathered community
of believers is itself the receiver of confession and the proclaimer of for-
giveness and absolution.
Reese, supra note 45, at 82 n.98. Should, in fact, a penitent approaching a "Muslim"
[sic] minister be excluded from the protection of confidentiality? Or indeed, is one
man's religion another's "pietistic group?" See discussion on this topic in the recom-
mendations section infra note 231 and accompanying text.
75. Ponder, supra note 73, at 3.
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compel the minister to testify, and it is thus better for all con-
cerned to avoid requiring him to do so in the first instance.7 6
Ministers also are often not called upon to testify because
it is uncomfortable for a judge to attempt to compel a minis-
ter to violate a deeply felt religious belief. It is highly proba-
ble, in addition, that assessing punitive measures against a re-
calcitrant priest, rabbi, or minister will raise the ire of the
community and bring down the wrath of public opinion on thejudge. Judges may consider that the interests of the judicial
system, and the public perception of justice in our society,
would be best served by allowing ministers to avoid
testimony.
The legislature, sensitive to public sentiment and to thejudge's dilemma, will thus often enact a statute which allows
the clergyman not to testify. An excellent example is provided
by an unpublished case, Van Sant v. Ross. 77 In Van Sant, a
Delaware police detective sued his mother-in-law for the
alienation of affection of his wife. The plaintiff subpoenaed
the Rev. Percy F. Rex, an Episcopal Rector, to testify about
conversations that he, the plaintiff, had had with the Rector.
The plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating that he waived his
right to assert any privileges7 8 and requested that the Rector
testify. The Rector refused, stating that the waiver would not
excuse his religious requirement that confidential communica-
tions not be disclosed.7e The trial judge took the matter under
76. This theory may, however, not withstand close scrutiny when one considers
that many state statutes allow the penitent to waive the privilege. A minister may
thus still be compelled to testify, through the waiver of the penitent, even if the for-
mer's religous scruples would forbid such testimony. If the purpose of the privilege is
to avoid compelling the minister, since potential punishment would not encourage his
testimony, then he should not be compelled to testify even where waiver is made by
the penitent. (In fact, however, some states do not require a minister to testify even if
the penitent waives the privilege. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1034 (West 1966)).Thus perhaps the rationale that "the minister won't testify anyway" would apply in
these states, while the states requiring the minister to testify in the presence of a
waiver would use other justifications for the minister's privilege.
In addition, there are instances where the court's punitive sanctions have indeed
"encouraged" a recalcitrant minister to testify. See, e.g., People v. Smith, unreported
case, reprinted in Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 209.
77. Unpublished decision discussed in Reese, supra note 45, at 55. (In fact
many, if not most, of the cases which involve the minister's privilege never reach the
appellate level) Id.
78. At that time Delaware did not have a minister's privilege statute.
79. The Rector said:
I hope to establish a precedent. If I testify, then one precedent is estab-
19831
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advisement, reserving decision on whether to hold the Rector
in contempt.
The spector of this clergyman, a "pillar of the commu-
nity," being thrown in jail for upholding his cherished reli-
gious beliefs caused a great deal of controversy in Delaware.
Before the judge could decide the contempt issue, the Dela-
ware legislature enacted a minister's privilege statute. 80 Public
pressure to permit a minister to preserve the confidentiality of
his conversations has in fact been the impetus for the enact-
ment of other such statutes. In fact, the legislature may be
doing nothing more than recognizing the implicit practice of
trial attorneys. An attorney often will not attempt to compel
testimony from a reluctant minister. An attempt to force him
to testify, and certainly to attempt to invoke the court's
threat of punitive sanctions, would be in contravention of the
community spirit-and may in fact bring the wrath of the
jury to bear upon that attorney's client.
Another argument advanced in favor of the minister's
privilege is that compelling a clergyman to disclose confiden-
tial communication, where such disclosure would violate that
clergyman's religious beliefs, is prohibited by the first amend-
ment's free exercise clause.8 1 This theory has not been given
great weight by legal theoreticians (in fact the opposite has
been suggested-that the privilege violates the establishment
clause)." Despite the uncertainty of this constitutional argu-
ment, it has been widely felt that it is against the interests of
a free pluralistic society, and the spirit of religious freedom, to
compel a minister to violate his religious beliefs.
[I]f we decide that the witness shall testify, we prescribe a
course of conduct by which he will violate his spiritual
duties, subject himself to temporal loss, and perpetrate a
deed of infamy. If he commits an offense against religion;
lished. If I don't testify, then another is established, and people will
know there is a clergy in this state to whom they can go in confidence.
An awful lot for the profession hangs on the decision here. I don't in-
tend to testify, no matter what the judge decides.
Reese, supra note 45, at 55 n.2 (citing THE LIVING CHURCH, July 23, 1961, at 6 and
October 15, 1961, at 11).
80. Reese, supra note 45, at 55.
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82. As a detailed discussion of the constitutional issue raised by the minister's




if he is deprived of his office and of his bread, and thrown
forlorn and naked upon the wide world, an object for the
hand of scorn, to point its slow and moving finger at, we
must consider that this cannot be done without our par-
ticipation and coercion."
It has also been asserted that denying the privilege would
greatly hamper the activities of religious groups, with deleteri-
ous effects on our society. "If the privilege were taken away
and the confidential nature of penitential communication vio-
lated and disregarded, the work of the church would be
greatly hampered and a purely secular society would be well
on its way."8 4 Thus, the minister's privilege, in effect, allows
religious institutions to fulfill their mission without the dam-
aging interference which would result if privacy-an essential
element of church activity-were to be compromised.
Bentham, considered "the greatest opponent of privi-
lege,""5 has nevertheless acknowledged that the minister's
privilege deserves recognition. Wigmore, in his treatise, details
four "canons" by which the appropriateness of any privileged
communication should be tested." In summary, these are: 1)
Does the communication originate in a confidence or secrecy?;
2) Is confidentiality of communication essential to the rela-
tionship?; 3) Does the relationship deserve recognition and
countenance?; and 4) Would the injury to this relationship by
compulsory disclosure be greater than the benefit to justice?
Wigmore concludes that based on these four factors: "[The
minister's] privilege has adequate grounds for recognition. '87
In summation, then, though many courts have concluded
that it did not exist at common law, forty-six states have en-
acted such privilege statutes. The privilege has the following
policy justifications: 1) encouraging penitential communica-
tion is in society's best interest; 2) in most cases, compelling a
minister to testify will still not secure his testimony; 3) public
displeasure of judicial punishment of a clergyman for his
maintaining deeply held religious beliefs impels the legislature
to allow him to avoid testimony; and 4) society's interest in
83. Privileged Communications, supra note 4, at 203.
84. Ponder, supra note 73, at 3.
85. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2396, at 877 (McNaughten rev.
1961).
86. Id. at 878.
87. Id.
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assuring the development of religious institutions would be
damaged if the privacy of penitential communications were
not respected. Wigmore states that this privilege meets his
four basic requirements, and Bentham, an opponent of privi-
lege in general, concedes that this privilege is warranted.
VI. THE DEFINITION OF "CLERGY" UNDER THE STATUTES
Since the minister's privilege in England ceased to exist
after the Reformation, it is generally considered not to be part
of the common law.8 Thus the privilege, if it exists at all in
the United States, must be a creation of statute. Forty-six
states and the District of Columbia currently have statutes
which provide for confidentiality of communication to a cler-
gyman.89 These statutes are not identical and often provide
varying treatment of the privilege. First considered is the pre-
cise delineation of those to whom the privilege will apply. In-
deed the various statutory schemes use different words or
phrases to describe such a person. The different descriptions
used are (note that one statute may include several different
88. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
89. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 506
(1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001,
Rule 505 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
90-107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. R. OF CT.,
R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505
(West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp.
1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. 9 622.10 (West
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Supp. 1982);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.477 (West 1981); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1982); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A
(West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West
Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060
(Vernon 1952); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-506 (Supp. 1975);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981);
N.D. R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
17-23 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-13-16 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1606 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101
(1977).
Much of the information in notes 89-109 is contained in D. Jones, supra note 8,
at 21-22. The writer has updated and modified it for inclusion in this article.
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terms in its coverage):
Clergyman"
Member of the clergy 9'
Clergy of any organization or denomination usually re-
ferred to as a church92
Clergy of a religion authorized to perform a marriage
ceremony93
Priest or Priest of the Catholic Church 4
Priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic Faith 5
90. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 506(1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (1982); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1030-
1034 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146(b) (West Supp. 1982); DEL. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. §
14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp.
1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Supp.
1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West 1981); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505
(1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(West Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-
1-804 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-506 (Supp. 1975);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981);
N.D. R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-13-16 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); WYo. STAT. § 1-12-101
(1977).
91. N.D. R. EVID. 505 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979).
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979).
93. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981).
94. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 506(1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (1982); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-
1034 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146(b) West Supp. (1982); DEL. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. §
14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp.
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(West Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Supp. 1982); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID.
505 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1982); MICH. CoUP. LAWS §
600.2156 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(Vernon 1952); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 20-4-506 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R. OF EvID.
RULE 505 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2505 (West 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90(Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-16 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §
24-1-206 (1980); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1606 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-
400 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 905.06 (West 1975); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977).
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
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Minister 6
Minister of the Gospel9
Protestant minister of the Gospel98
Duly ordained minister of religion"
Regular minister of religion 00
Ordained or licensed minister01
Any Christian or Jewish minister by whatever name
called102
Rabbi 08
Christian Science Practitioner °'0
96. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA R. oF CT., R. or EVID. 506
(1982); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146(b) (West Supp. 1982); DEL. R. OF CT., R. OF EvID. 505 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. §
14-309 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); M.. R. OF CT., R. OF
EVID. 505 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. 13-
1-22 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35
(Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-
4-506 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIV. PROC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02
(Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040
(1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-16 (1979);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1606 (1973); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975).
97. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-111 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060
(Vernon 1952); N.D. R. Evrn. 505 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1606 (1973).
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
99. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1970); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
100. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); VA.
CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1982).
101. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A
(West 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
103. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 506
(1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West Supp. 1982); DEL. R. OF CT., R. OF
EvID. 505 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd
1966); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A
(West 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982); NEn. REV. STAT. § 27-506
(1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-506
(Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R. EVID. 505 (1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-16 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1982);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975).
104. DEL. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1981); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505
(1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS §
600.2156 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §
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Religious practitioner' 5
Rector of the Episcopal Church'"
Other similar functionary of a religious organization'07
Other person serving in a similar capacity (to that of a
clergyman) 08
Other person or practitioner authorized to perform simi-
lar functions (to those of clergy).'"9
The above list is indicative of the difficulty involved in
defining clergyman for the purpose of inclusion within the
privilege. It is a question with which legislative bodies have
struggled. The courts, on the other hand, have given little
consideration to construing the definition of a clergyman.
There are very few cases in which a court has been asked to
decide who is a clergyman entitled to assert the privilege. The
few cases that have considered this issue have approached it
from the viewpoint of inquiring not whether the affected per-
son was a minister or not-that is generally conceded-but,
rather, whether the particular clergyman belongs to a church
which requires him not to reveal confidential communica-
tions.110 There are no cases in which a person who claimed to
be a clergyman was denied the privilege due to a court deci-
sion that he was not covered by that state's statutory defini-
tion of clergy.
In addition, the courts have considered the question of
whether persons who do not themselves claim to be ministers
are nevertheless entitled to the privilege. At least two cases
have concluded that one does not even have to be ordained to
come within the purview of the privilege."' In one case, mem-
4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R. EvID. 505
(1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-
13-16 (1979); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
105. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146(b) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980).
107. ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 506 (1982); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034
(WEST 1966); ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp.
1982); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-506 (1979); N.M. STAT. AN. § 20-4-506 (Supp. 1975);
N.D. R. EvID. 505 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 19-13-16 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975).
108. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon 1952).
109. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1982).
110. See infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
111. See In Re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Reutkemeier v.
Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917). But see Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
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bers of a counselling staff of an ordained minister, who them-
selves were not ordained, were nevertheless considered minis-
ters, since they were working under the direction of an
ordained minister. Whether other courts, especially in states
with narrowly drawn statutes, would so hold is open to ques-
tion. Yet the Mississippi legislature dealt with an analogous
question by including in its statute the unique provision that
"a clergyman's secretary, stenographer or clerk shall not be
examined without the consent of the clergyman concerning
any fact, the knowledge of which was acquired in such
capacity."11
Courts have reached different conclusions on whether the
privilege applies to elders or deacons of a church. In
Reutkemeier v. Nolte"" it was held that elders of a Presbyte-
rian church were included in a statute which granted the priv-
ilege to "ministers of the gospel." While in Knight v. Lee'"
the court concluded that an elder and deacon of the Christian
Church acting on behalf of the Church pastor was not covered
by the minister's privilege.""
The outer limits of the definition of clergyman are not yet
clearly delineated. Thus the question remains, for example,
whether Christian Science practitioners are ministers for the
purpose of privilege statutes. Of course, in determining
whether any person is included within the privilege it is neces-
sary to closely scrutinize the details of that particular jurisdic-
tion's statute. California defines clergyman as "a priest, minis-
ter, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or
of a religious denomination or religious organization.""' Com-
pare that wording with the Alabama statute's more restrictive
description which defines clergyman as:
Any duly ordained, licensed or commissioned minister,
pastor, priest, rabbi or practitioner of any bona fide es-
tablished church or religious organization and shall in-
clude and be limited to any person who regularly, as a
vocation, devotes a substantial portion of his time and
abilities to the service of his respective church or religious
112. MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1981).
113. 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
114. 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
115. Id. at 203. For a full discussion of the definition of a clergyman for the
purpose of privilege statutes, see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1973).




The New Hampshire code is much broader in defining a cler-
gyman only as "a priest, rabbi or ordained minister of any
church or a duly accredited Christian Science practi-
tioner. . . ."I" A Christian Science practitioner would then
clearly be included in New Hampshire, probably also included
in California, while in Alabama it remains an open question.
There are a number of other questions which await fur-
ther elucidation by the courts. Are part-time ministers clergy-
men? In fact some denominations (e.g., Christian Science)
prefer their ministers to be only part-time. Yet the Alabama
code defines a minister as one devoting a substantial portion
of his time to the service of his respective church.11 While no
case has yet dealt with this issue, many clergymen responding
to the pressures of an inflationary economy are accepting em-
ployment outside the church or synagogue. Would such em-
ployment mean that those clergymen are no longer entitled to
the minister's privilege, even for legitimate church-related
activities?
Is there an age requirement for ministers? Most statutes
do not contain any reference to an age requirement.'2 0 Yet,
there are some denominations that have designated children
to fulfill the role of minister and who regularly preach at
church revival meetings.' Again, the courts have not spoken
on this issue. While it is hard to see how a court could find
that all Jehovah's Witnesses are ministers, that denomination
does so allege. 22 One state implicitly considered this problem
117. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1982) (emphasis added).
118. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1981).
119. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982). This "full-time" requirement raises
intriguing possibilities. There are a fair number of Catholic priests engaged in full-
time teaching (many on law faculties). Is such a priest disqualified from claiming the
privilege, even for statements made to him in the confessional, because he is not de-
voting "substantial ... time" to the church? The issues raised here will be further
discussed in the "Recommendations" section, infra notes 236-38 and accompanying
text.
120. However, Tennessee and Virginia define a clergyman as one over the age of
eighteen. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); VA. CODE § 8-01-400 (1977).
121. Reese, supra note 45, at 66-67 n.43 (citing Qualified to Be Ministers,
WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY 256 (1955)).
122. Jehovah's Witnesses constitute a society of ministers .... He has
been "called" to the ministry by his fellow believers and the Witnesses
resent very deeply the fact that the persons whom they have called to
the ministerial office are refused the recognition and denied the privi-
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and expressly excluded such persons. Pennsylvania's statute,
since repealed, excepted "clergymen or ministers who are self-
ordained or who are members of religious organizations in
which members other than the leader thereof are deemed cler-
gymen or ministers."' s
The entire issue of alternative religious groups is also one
upon which the courts have not spoken in the context of the
minister's privilege. Many statutes use language which seems
to apply only to religions that are of Judaeo-Christian ori-
gin. 24 Such statutes would pose no problem when applied to
ministers, priests or rabbis of "established" religions. How is a
minister of the Moslem faith, or even of the Unification
Church, to be treated under such a statute? The Georgia stat-
ute, for example, states that,
every communication . . . made ... to any Protestant
minister of the Gospel, or to any priest of the Roman
Catholic faith, or to any priest of the Greek Orthodox
Catholic faith, or to any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian
or Jewish minister, by whatever name called, shall be
deemed privileged.'25
This statute would seem clearly to exclude the aforemen-
tioned clergy.
Aside from any potential constitutional limitations on the
religion clauses, there seems to be no valid reason to exclude
such groups in view of the policy of the privilege. If we wish to
encourage people to bare their souls in the search for spiritual
comfort, is not a Moslem believer to be given the same oppor-
tunity? Does not society equally benefit when a Unification
Church member confesses to his clergyman and receives "the
soul's calm sunshine, and the heartfelt joy of confession?"'12 6
To this date there are no judicial pronouncements in this
lege, that the Anglican parson, the Catholic priest, and the Methodist or
Baptist Congregationalist minister enjoy. Ministers are divided into the
two classes of Pioneers and Publishers.
Reese, supra note 45, at 66 n.45 (quoting Jehovah's Witnesses Royston Pilke, 1954,
published by Philosophical Library Inc., N.Y.).
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 331 (Purdon 1959) (repealed 1978), listed here for
historical interest only. (The constitutional implications of this requirement are be-
yond the -scope of this paper).
124. See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
125. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
126. People v. Smith, unreported case reprinted in Privileged Communications,
supra note 4, at 204.
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area. In any case, as previously mentioned, there would seem
to be grave constitutional concerns with, for example, exclud-
ing a Moslem priest from the privilege while extending that
same right to a Catholic priest or rabbi. The definitive judicial
consideration of these restrictive delineations of a clergyman
is yet to be pronounced.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMMUNICATION BE
MADE TO A MINISTER IN HIS PROFESSIONAL CHARACTER
While generally communication to a minister is privileged
in those states that recognize the privilege, not all statements
made to a clergyman are privileged. Clearly, for instance, con-
versations with a minister of an informal nature, relating to a
clergyman's hobby would not be protected. Virtually all states
include a requirement in their respective statutes that the
communication in question be made to the minister in "his
professional character.112 7 The courts have consistently given
this requirement a very broad reading and have excluded
communications that were not made to a clergyman in his
professional capacity.
An Iowa court held that a minister summoned by a doc-
tor to act as an interpreter could testify about that conversa-
tion, since the minister had not served in his professional
character, but merely as an interpreter. 12 8 Further, testimony
of a priest as to his services as a notary on a deed was also
held not privileged since the priest was not acting as a spiri-
tual adviser but rather as a notary public. 2 In State v.
Berry,'80 the court faced the question of whether communica-
tion was made to a clergyman in his role as a minister. The
127. Exceptions to this requirement are Alaska, where a communication is con-
fidential if made privately and not intended for further disclosure, ALASKA R. OF CT.,
Rules 506(2)(b) and 503(a)(5) (Supp. 1982); California and Kansas do not require
that the communication be made to a clergyman in his professional character but do
require that the communication be "penitential." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1032 (West
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976); Louisiana requires that the communi-
cation must be made in confidence, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-477 (West 1981); Ver-
mont's statute states the communication must be made "under the sanctity of a reli-
gious confessional," VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973). Georgia, which perhaps has
the most liberal of any statute, requires only that the penitent be "professing reli-
gious faith, or seeking spiritual comfort," GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
128. Blossi v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 144 Iowa 697, 123 N.W. 360 (1909).
129. Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo. 3221, 119 S.W. 415 (1909).
130. 324 So.2d 822 (La. 1975).
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defendant came to the minister's sister's apartment to pawn a
watch. After the sister refused, the defendant spoke to the
minister and in the course of negotiations with him for a loan,
the defendant implied that he had killed the owner of the
watch. The court held that the communication was not privi-
leged since it was not made to the minister in his professional
character.
Sometimes the line is blurred between the "professional
character" requirement and the requirement that the purpose
of the conversation at issue be the search for "religious or
spiritual" advice. It appears that courts will sometimes con-
sider only those conversations made for the purposes of seek-
ing spiritual or religious comfort to be ones that are within
the professional character of a clergyman. Thus a Minnesota
court in a recent decision, State v. Black,"11 held that a defen-
dant who, while in pre-trial confinement, asked a prison chap-
lain to phone his friends outside the jail, was not entitled to
assert the privilege. "Defendant claims that because he was
seeking the aid of [the chaplain], his communication is privi-
leged. However, the wording of the statute indicates that reli-
gious or spiritual modifies advice, aid, or comfort, not just ad-
vice. Thus, the aid requested of [the chaplain] must be
religious aid to be privileged."'
Very closely related to the "professional character" re-
quirement is the common statutory provision that the com-
munication in question be penitential in character. In a recent
and highly publicized case, 188 a New York court denied the
privilege for failure to meet this requirement. The defendant,
a Roman Catholic priest who was also a New York City coun-
cilman, was held in contempt for refusing to answer questions
prepared by a grand jury panel. The grand jury was investi-
gating alleged abuses in city jails, whereby certain persons
were being given preferential treatment because of their affili-
ation with organized crime. The grand jury solicited the
priest's testimony about a communication that he had had
with corrections officials, in reference to placing a prisoner in
a work-release program. The priest based his refusal to answer
on the minister's privilege. The New York Court of Appeals
131. 291 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1980).
132. Id. at 216.




upheld the priest's ten day jail sentence for contempt. It held
that "[t]he priest-penitent privilege arises not because state-
ments are made to a clergyman. Rather, something more is
needed . . [I]t is only confidential communications made
to a clergyman in his spiritual capacity which the law endeav-
ors to protect.' 13 4 Other cases have consistently given a wide
construction to the requirement that the communication be
penitential in character and have denied the privilege. 35
One court, however, has held that statements made in the
course of draft counseling were penitential in nature and
made to the clergyman in his professional capacity. The court
found that since a draft registrant's relationship with the se-
lective system involves "very deep and intimate spiritual and
moral considerations" such communication is properly within
the scope of the privilege. 3 6 It is worth noting that the court
based its holding in part on the Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence.137 The provisions relating to the minister's privilege
were, however, not finally enacted into law. Instead the
adopted rule provides that privileges, in general, "shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. "8
In addition it must be noted that this was a Viet Nam era
decision (1971), which perhaps explains this court's unique
holding. It is arguable that in 1971, draft counseling was part
of a clergyman's professional activities. The case may indicate
that the "professional character" of a minister may not be im-
mutable. It is therefore possible that depending on the social
climate and political atmosphere at a given time, a minister's
134. Id. The concurring and dissenting opinion by J. Kupferman, in which he
took a rather different approach, is worth noting. In quoting Matthew 23:21 and Luke
20:25 ("Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's") he stated,
"Nevertheless, I would reduce the commitment as a matter of discretion to one day.
The principle having been established, no purpose would be served by a longer period
of incarceration."
135. See, e.g., In re Koelher's Estate, 162 Kan. 395, 176 P.2d 544 (1947) (state-
ment made to a priest while he was acting as a witness to a will held not privileged);
Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171, 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (statement made to a minister as
a friend rather than a clergyman held not privileged).
136. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
137. 51 F.R.D. 315, 371 (1971) (revised draft Proposed Rules of Evidence for
United States Courts and Magistrates).
138. FED. R. EvID. 501, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1975). For a more complete discus-
sion of the privilege in the federal courts see infra text accompanying notes 192-205.
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professional activities may change. Nevertheless, the clear di-
rection of judicial opinion is to contract, rather than expand,
the legitimate sphere of the professional character of
clergymen.
A. Marriage Counseling
Perhaps no area falls more clearly within the clergyman's
professional character than marriage counseling. Couples ex-
periencing marital difficulties often visit their pastor for aid,
guidance, and spiritual direction. In this process they may
well reveal their most intimate personal and family problems.
It would therefore seem likely that there would be little ques-
tion that statements made during pastoral marriage counsel-
ing would be privileged.
Various courts that have ruled on this issue have pro-
duced different results. A California court"3 9 indicated that
marital counseling communication was not privileged, while a
New York court,10 with a substantially similar fact situation
and statute, held that it was. In holding that it was privi-
leged, the New York court looked at the expectation of the
parties and concluded that both parties would not have met
with the rabbi if they had not fully expected their communi-
cation to remain immune to judicial investigation. The Cali-
fornia court, however, closely examined the California statute,
found marriage counseling not to be covered, and thus de-
clared, in dictum, that conversation in the course of marriage
counseling was not privileged. Other courts have similarly di-
vided on this issue.141
In considering the policy of the privilege, marital commu-
nications should be privileged since it is in the interest of soci-
ety to encourage persons to seek spiritual guidance in solving
marital problems. The family, as the revered basic structure
of society, should be given every opportunity to be sal-
139. Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965). See also
infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
140. Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1961), appeal
dismissed, 16 A.D.2d 735, 226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962).
141. See, e.g., the following cases which found that the privilege does apply to
marital counseling; Pardie v. Pardie, 158 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1968); Le Gore v. Le
Gore, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 107 (1963); People v. Pecora, 107 Ill. App. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d
865, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1969) (clergyman refused to testify in murder trial of
husband, whom the clergyman had counseled about marital problems). But see In re
Shaeffer's Estate, 52 Dauphin Co. Reports 45 (Pa. 1942) (privilege denied).
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vaged-including the opportunity to consult a minister, with
the confidence that any conversation in that consultation will
forever remain privileged.142 From the perspective of the min-
ister, marital counseling is a legitimate exercise of pastoral
duties which should warrant the protection of the privilege
equal to any other communication. In fact, certain religious
denominations, the Episcopal Church for example, require a
minister to actively engage in marriage counseling. 143
Perhaps in recognition of the importance of maintaining
the confidentiality of marital counseling, several statutes ex-
plicitly include it in their minister's statute. Thus, for exam-
ple, Alabama specifically enumerates in its definition of privi-
leged communication the situation where one approaches a
clergyman "to enlist help or advice in connection with a mari-
tal problem."' 44 Delaware was the first state in the United
States to specifically enumerate marital counseling as a privi-
leged activity by enacting a statute which reads: "No priest
• . . shall be examined . . . with respect to any communica-
tion made to him in his professional capacity, by either
spouse, in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged
spouses .... ,,146 These statutes accurately reflect that mari-
tal counseling is a legitimate exercise of the minister's func-
tion and therefore unquestionably deserving of the shield of
confidentiality. There is no reason why psychologists and psy-
chiatrists may counsel couples with full assurance of confiden-
tiality, while clergymen doing similar work do not enjoy the
same protection. It remains to be seen whether courts in those
states whose privilege statutes do not specifically delineate
142. Counseling in general has been widely recognized to be included in the
minister's privilege. Yet marital counseling, as opposed to personal counseling, has
not been universally recognized as being privileged. The writer has found no com-
mentator who discusses this disparity. Yet it is fascinating to consider why, in light of
so many court decisions emphasizing the importance of the family unit, counseling
relating to preserving that unit has achieved only a limited privilege.
143. As one commentator notes:
Many churches, either by written or unwritten church discipline, require
marriage counseling as is required in the Episcopal Church by Canon 16,
§ 6(c) which reads: "when marital unity is imperilled by dissension, it
shall be the duty of either or both parties, before contemplating legal
action, to lay the matter before a Minister of this Church; and it shall be
the duty of such minister to labor that the parties may be reconciled."
Reese, supra note 45, at 72.
144. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982).
145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4316 (1975), repealed by Del. R. Ct., R. of Evid.
505 (1981) (this new rule is modeled after the Uniform Rules of Evidence).
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marital counseling 46 will adopt this enlightened interpreta-
tion of penitential communication. This is one area of the
privilege that is undoubtedly destined for future litigation,'
47
especially considering the increasing divorce rate in the
United States.
VIII. THE "DISCIPLINE ENJOINED" REQUIREMENT
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have a
provision in their statutes which requires that in order for a
communication to a clergyman to be privileged, it must be
made in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of prac-
tice of his church.14 8 This requirement has spawned much liti:-
gation to delineate its exact parameters. 4 9 Different courts
have construed it in vastly different ways, with the general
tendency being to interpret this clause so as to exclude many
statements made to clergymen. Thus an Arkansas court held
that:
The communications that are made privileged by this
statute are those which are made in the course of disci-
pline by reason of the rules of the religious denomination
.... Before the statements or confessions made to a
minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination can
be held to be inadmissible, it must appear from the evi-
dence that they were made to such minister or priest...
because enjoined by the rules of discipline or practice of
such religious denomination. 5 '
146. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1032 (West Supp. 1982).
147. See generally Note, "Is There a Time to Keep Silence?", supra note 28.
148. Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. See supra note 68.
149. The "he" or "his" church generally refers to the clergyman, and not the
penitent. Yet, statutes are not uniformly clear. Some statutes, however, make it very
clear that the church discipline requirement applies to the minister and not to the
penitents. Representative is the California statute which states that a penitential
communication is one made to a clergyman, "who, in the course of discipline or prac-
tice of his church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear
such communication and, under the discipline or tenets of his church, denomination,
or organization, has a duty to keep such communications secret." CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1032 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
150. Alford v. Johnson, 103 Ark. 236, 237, 146 S.W. 516, 517 (1912). Arkansas
has since amended its statute to remove this requirement. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001,
Rule 505 (1979).
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Other courts have also broadly interpreted the "discipline
enjoined" clause, with the result that the privilege has been
denied. In an Ohio case,'81 the plaintiff claimed to be the
widow of the decedent while the defendant estate claimed
that the decedent was in fact single. At issue was the admissi-
bility of certain statements relating to a church census made
to a priest by the decedent while the former had been in dece-
dent's home. It was alleged that the decedent had stated to
the priest, in the course of conversation, that he, the dece-
dent, "had been single all his life." The court ruled that the
statements were admissible since they had not been made "in
the understood pursuance of that church discipline giving rise
to confessional relations, and therefore, ...were not privi-
leged and that the privilege applied in particular to confes-
sions of sin only, not to communications of other tenor."' '
A similar rationale obtained in the California case of
Simrin v. Simrin. 51 The plaintiff husband attempted to mod-
ify the custody provisions of an impending divorce decree.
The defendant wife called as a witness a rabbi who had acted
as a marriage counselor for the couple. The rabbi declined to
testify. The wife waived her privilege, but the husband did
not, claiming that the communication was privileged by virtue
of the minister's privilege. The court, in dictum, stated that
the communication was not privileged since the privilege "is
limited to confessions in the course of discipline enjoined by
the church. It would wrench the language of the statute to
hold that it applies to communications made to a religious or
spiritual advisor acting as a marriage counselor."'8 4 The court
felt that marriage counseling was not "a discipline enjoined by
the church," and thus the privilege of confidentiality did not
extend to statements made to a minister in the course of the
counseling relationship.
It is worthwhile to closely analyze this "discipline en-joined" requirement, for the issues involved may result in un-
usual-and unexpected-consequences. Does that clause
151. In re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App. 2d 271, 220 N.E.2d 547 (1966).
152. Id. at 303, 36 Ohio App. 2d at 421, 220 N.E.2d at 568-69.
153. 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965).
154. Id. at 94, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79. Despite this interpretation the court did
not compel the rabbi to testify. It held that an agreement entered into by the couple
with the rabbi prior to counseling, wherein the marital partners agreed not to call the
rabbi as a witness was not void against public policy and upheld it.
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mean the penitent must make a statement to a clergyman
that is permitted by the church to which he (the clergyman)
belongs? Or must there be a religious obligation on the peni-
tent to confess his sins to a clergyman?
An Arkansas court in Sherman v. State,155 held that only
those statements made by virtue of religious obligation were
privileged. In Sherman, a defendant charged with rape had
sent a letter to his minister (Protestant) asking for prayer and
implying his guilt. The court held that the minister's privilege
did not apply since
the statute does not apply unless the confession is made
"in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of such
denomination.""' . . . There is no evidence in this case
that there is any discipline or rule or practice of the
church to which appellant and his pastor belonged which
enjoins upon its members the duty to make a confession
of sins.
A similar result is suggested by one of the first cases in the
United States to ever consider the privilege. 57 The court did
not allow a Protestant minister to claim the privilege. It dis-
tinguished that case from a previous one involving a priest,
stating that in the former case, "by the established canons, or
ordinances of that church, confessions are made by the mem-
bers at least once a year, to the priest in private."' 58
The implication of such a holding, were it to be applied
ubiquitously, is truly confounding. There are indeed few reli-
gious denominations that require formal confession, and it
would then be only members of those denominations who
would be privileged-and only when making "confessions" to
clergymen of those denominations.
The Catholic Church certainly requires confession of its
adherents, as the following excerpt from a book on Catholic
doctrine indicates:
Why, confession was known even in Old Testament
times. It was the sacrament of Penance which Christ in-
stituted. But the practice of confession of sin was even
155. 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.W. 353 (1926).
156. Id. at 149, 279 S.W. at 354 (quoting Alford v. Johnson, 103 Ark. 236, 237,
146 S.W. 516, 517 (1912)), quoted in Reese, supra note 45, at 67 n.48.
157. People v. Smith, unreported case, quoted in Privileged Communications,
supra note 4, at 209.
158. Id. at 211 n.2.
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then a condition for forgiveness. We read in the book of
Numbers V, 5-7: "And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying:
'When a man or woman shall have committed any of all
the sins that men are wont to commit ... they shall con-
fess their sin and restore the principal itself, and the fifth
part over and above, to him against whom they have
sinned . . . "
That is the way in which the Church has always be-
lieved and acted, for Christ made it an important matter.
The confession of mortal sin is a requirement for eternal
salvation.18
The Lutheran Church also seems to require confession. 10 The
Episcopal Church similarly, although having no requirement
for periodic confession, does require marriage counseling. 61
Were the discipline enjoined clause to be interpreted as
the Sherman court did, it would seem that only members of
the aforementioned religions would be entitled to assert the
minister's privilege. 1 2 Even in those denominations questions
exist. Catholic doctrine, for example, only requires that con-
fession be made once a year. Would the second confession be
held not privileged? One can imagine a district attorney
scouring the country in search of a priest to whom a recalci-
trant witness had made a prior confession in order to prove
that the "second confession" was not mandatory and there-
fore not privileged. Consider also statements made just prior
159. F. NOLL, FATHER SMITH INSTRUCTS JACKSON (no date) quoted in Jones,
aupra note 8, at 9 (emphasis in the original). See also Codex Juris Canonici, canon
906 (1918), which requires that the communicant attend the Sacrament of Penance
once a year.
160. The Augusburg Confession, Eleventh article states: "Of confession, they
teach, that Private Absolution ought to be retained in the churches, although in con-
fession an enumeration of all sins is not necessary. For it is impossible according to
the Psalm: 'Who can understand his errors?' (Psalm 19:12)." J. NEv, THE AUGUS-
aURG CONFESSION 10 (1914), quoted in W. TiEMANN, supra note 10, at 151.
161. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text. See also W. TmmANN,
supra note 10, at 68 n.55.
162. In fact, yet another fascinating question exists. Many churches have provi-
sions for church trials, where a church member is summoned to testify, and is re-
quired to do so at the threat of some great spiritual harm. Should the testimony at
such a trial be considered to be mandated by the discipline of the church, similar to
compulsory confession in the Catholic Church? An Iowa court held that such testi-
mony in a trial before the elders of the Presbyterian Church was privileged. In that
case a fourteen-year-old girl was called and testified before a "court" of two Presbyte-
rian elders, in reference to alleged sexual relations with a man. That testimony was
held privileged in a later civil trial of a claim by the girl's father against the man.
Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
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to confession. Let us assume that a penitent says to a priest
"Father, I have done a terrible deed and want to confess."
They then repair to the confessional where the priest hears
the confession. Since the Roman Catholic Church only re-
quires that the secrecy of the seal of confession be applied to
the sacrament of confession, it would seem that these intro-
ductory words would not be privileged. A priest, therefore,
while he could not be called to testify to that which was said
during confession, might be forced to testify to the prelimi-
nary words.16 "Ordinary" counseling and marriage counseling
(other than those denominations which require marriage
counseling, e.g., the Episcopal Church) would not be privi-
leged since it is not mandated by the church. Additionally,
most Protestants, Jews, and members of nonreligious groups
would not be entitled to the privilege since they have no
mandatory "confession.'
6 4
Perhaps because the above difficulties can result from in-
terpreting the "discipline enjoined" requirement restrictively,
few courts have so done. Some courts have found that those
words mean only that the clergyman-as opposed to the peni-
tent-must have an obligation to keep the communications si-
lent. This, however, does not completely solve the problem,
for there are few denominations which have formal require-
ments that their ministers do not reveal confidential
communications.
The Catholic Church, however, does have such a formal
requirement. It not only requires confession as a sacrament,
but also recognizes that the contents of that confessional are
inviolate and must never be repeated under any circum-
stances.'6 5 Few Protestant denominations have explicit re-
163. No state has a statutory provision which explicitly deals with this issue.
Puerto Rico, however, states that one may not compel testimony from a clergyman
"as to information obtained by him from a person about to make a confession and
received in the course of preparation for such confession" (emphasis added). P.R.
LAWs ANN. tit. 32, § 1734 (1954).
164. The Protestant churches have no mandatory requirement for penitential or
counsel-seeking communications within a specified time period, but it is understood
that when the need arises a communicant ought to seek spiritual aid and counsel
from his minister. Reese, supra note 45, at 68. In consulting doctrinal rulings of Juda-
ism and non Judeo-Christian faiths, the writer could find no denomination which
requires mandatory "confession" to the clergy. 4 NEw CATH. ENCYCL. 134 (1967).
165. Historically and theologically, then, the seal means the inviolable
obligation to avoid all use of confessional knowledge that would lead
directly or indirectly to the identification and betrayal of the penitent.
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quirements that ministers keep their private communications
confidential. The American Baptist Convention has included
the following statement in their ministerial code of ethics: "I
will hold as sacred all confidences shared with me."16  The
Lutheran Church, in its twenty-second Biennial Convention
report in 1960 stated that:
In keeping with the historic discipline and practice of
the Lutheran Church and to be true to a sacred trust in-
herent in the nature of the pastoral office, no minister of
the United Lutheran Church in America shall divulge any
confidential disclosure given to him in the course of his
care of souls or otherwise in his professional capacity, ex-
cept with the express permission of the person who has
confided in him or in order to prevent the commission of
a crime.167
Kinds of Violation. There is direct violation when the penitent is
clearly identified and is betrayed in relation to matters revealed by him
in confession. It is not necessary that the penitent be named; equivalent
identification entails direct violation. There is indirect violation of the
seal when, even though no betrayal is intended, confessional matter is
disclosed in such circumstances that there is a danger that the penitent
can and may be identified and betrayed. Such is the case, for instance, if
a sin is mentioned without indicating the penitent, or if a penitent isindicated without mentioning sin, when there is a danger.that a third
party will come to the conclusion that a specific penitent has confessed a
specific sin.
4 NEw CATH. ENCYCL. 134 (1967). See Canon 889 (The Seal of the Confessional) § 1,
quoted in 4 AUGUSTINE, CODE OF CANON LAW 300 (3d rev. ed. 1925) ("The sacramental
seal is inviolable, and hence the confessor shall be most careful not to betray the
penitent by any words or sign, or in any other way for any reason Whatsoever.") SeeCanon 2369 which reads that the confessor "who dares to break the seal of confessiondirectly remains under excommunication reserved modo specialissimo to the Apos-
tolic See." Latin original translated in Hogan, supra note 9, at 3-4. This has beenjudicially noticed by the District of Columbia which has stated: "Was the disclosure
of appellant to the minister a confidential confession to a spiritual adviser? The an-
swer would be clearer were the relationship of priest and penitent involved where the
priest is known to be bound to silence by the discipline and laws of his church.
Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (emphasis added). See
also In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Angleton v. Angleton, 84
Idaho 184, 370 P.2d 788 (1962).
166. MINISTERS COUNCIL OF AMERICAN BAPTIST CONVENTION, MY CODE OF ETHICs
1.
167. The United Lutheran Church, Minutes of the Twenty-Second Biennial
Convention of the United Lutheran Church of America 277, 758 (1960) quoted in W.
TmMANN, supra note 10, at 52.
The Presbyterian Church has no explicit requirement that conversations be kept
confidential, although it is generally so understood and practiced by its clergy. Inter-
view with Professor John Irvine, Registrar of The San Francisco Theological Semi-
nary (April 30, 1982).
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Most Protestant denominations, however, do not have
formal rulings which mandate professional secrecy. Nor do
Rabbis have such explicit provisions. The vast majority of
ministers, due to personal conscience and the realization that
their effectiveness as clergy members would be destroyed, op-
erate under a self imposed duty of confidentiality. "'
Thus even interpreting the "discipline enjoined" clause
only to mean that the minister must have an obligation to
keep the communication confidential is not a panacea. The re-
Note that it is virtually impossible to review all church rulings, resolutions, con-
ference reports and recommendations of the various denominations dealing with the
obligation of confidentiality. The problem becomes even more difficult when one real-
izes that while national religious bodies may not issue rulings on this matter, local or
regional groups may. Thus, for instance, the Presbytery of Newark, New Jersey,
passed a resolution:
That all information or knowledge of whatsoever nature imparted, con-
fided or discussed with a clergyman of this presbytery in his official role,
whether as an advisor, confidant or counselor, shall be construed as
strictly confidential and thus a privileged communication.
W. TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 28. Does this qualify as a provision enjoining that, by
the discipline of the church, a Presbyterian minister must keep communications con-
fidential? Or is that true only of those ministers in the Newark Presbytery?
In addition, some denominations have in their ministers association code of eth-
ics a provision mandating secrecy. An example is the Unitarian Church. Interview
with Bob Lehman, Pastor of the First Unitarian Church in San Jose, California (May
4, 1982). A Unitarian minister is, however, not required to belong to the ministers'
association and thus is not necessarily bound by its code of ethics. Does a provision in
the code of ethics qualify under the discipline enjoined requirement?
No court has spoken on these issues. What is clear is that most Protestant de-
nominations and branches of the Jewish faith do not have a written formal require-
ment of confidentiality. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
168. Jones, supra note 8, at vi-vii states:
Such stringent rules are not written into the discipline of most Protes-
tant denominations and other religious groups. However, the vast major-
ity of ministers labor under at least an implied restriction and feel that
the betrayal of a confidence would be tantamount to the destruction of
their effectiveness as members of the clergy. Thus, while the religious
organizations to which many ministers belong do not have specific ca-
nons or rules regarding the safeguarding of confidential information
shared with clergy, the question of revealing or not revealing informa-
tion received in confidence involves the matter of conscience as well as
the matter of a relationship with the courts.
Reese, however, believes that Protestant clergy have an "understood" requirement of
confidentiality:
The ministers of most Protestant churches likewise are obligated to
keep confidential the communications revealed to them in their ministe-
rial capacity. Although many denominations have not spelled out the
precise description or definition of their discipline, their uncodified dis-
cipline or practice is as binding on them as though it were written.
Reese, supra note 45, at 69.
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suit may still be that only denominations with requirements
of confidentiality are entitled to the privilege. This interpreta-
tion could raise serious first amendment establishment and
free exercise of religion questions since it may require a court
to minutely examine the doctrine, rulings, and holdings of
specific denominations to determine whether it has a formal
requirement of secrecy. It would seem much more appropriate
for a court to take judicial notice of the fact that it is common
knowledge that all clergymen do perceive themselves to have a
moral and ethical obligation to keep private matters secret,
and not require formal denominational dicta.1"9
The most common judicial interpretation has been that
the "discipline enjoined" clause does not go so far as to belimited to those churches that have formal secrecy require-
ments. An example of this is an often-quoted, well known
Minnesota case, In re Swenson,170 which has been called "the
most liberal judicial construction of a privileged communica-
tion statute."17' The court held that:
The "discipline enjoined" includes the "practice" of all
clergymen to be trained so as to advance such "disci-pline", to be alert and efficient and submissive to duty, to
concern themselves in the moral training of others, to be
as willing to give spiritual aid, advice, or comfort as
others are to receive it, and to be keenly concerned in re-
formatory methods of correction leading towards spiritual
confidence .... [I]t is sufficient whether such "disci-
pline" enjoins the clergyman to receive the communica-
tion or whether it enjoins the other party, if a member of
the church, to deliver the communication. Such practice
makes the communication privileged, when accompanied
169. Most clergy will not testify concerning confidential communications
regardless of whether there is a statutory privilege. They are bound by
an overpowering discipline that dictates the strictest standards of con-
duct concerning the maintenance of the inviolability of the confidential
communication made to them in their ministerial capacity. This is just
as true of most Protestant clergy as it is of the Roman Catholic. ...
People take for granted they have the complete right to talk to their
ministers penitentially in confidence. "Whether it is the law or not
. . , people have the right to go to an ordained clergyman and tell
their troubles without fear. This is the refuge of people in trouble, ac-
knowledged by all men of good-will."
Reese, supra note 45, at 81 n.96 (citing THE LNG CHURCH, July 23, 1961, at 6).
170. 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
171. Reese, supra note 45, at 68.
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by the essential characteristics, though made by a person
not a member of the particular church or of any
church. " "
Also, in an emphatic acknowledgement of the desirability of
encouraging confidential communications, the court found
that the legislative intent was to give a broad interpretation to
the privilege:
If we are to construe this statute as meaning that the only
"confession" that is privileged is the compulsory one
under the rules of the particular church, it would be ap-
plicable only, if our information is correct, to the priest of
the Roman Catholic Church. Certainly the Legislature
never intended the absurdity of having the protection ex-
tend to the clergy of but one church ...
We are of the opinion that the "confession" contem-
plated by the statute has reference to a penitential ac-
knowledgement to a clergyman of actual or supposed
wrongdoing while seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid,
or comfort, and that it applies to a voluntary "confession"
as well as to one made under a mandate of the church.
The clergyman's door should always be open; he should
hear all who come regardless of their church affiliation
The statute has a direct reference to the church's "disci-
pline" of and for the clergyman and as to his duties as
enjoined by its rules or practice. It is a matter of common
knowledge, and we take judicial notice of the fact, that
such "discipline" is traditionally enjoined upon all clergy-
men by the practice of their respective churches. Under
such "discipline" enjoined by such practice all faithful
clergymen render such help to the spiritually sick and
cheerfully offer consolation to suppliants who come in re-
sponse to the call of conscience. .... 17
The Swenson court's interpretation has gradually become
the dominant one, as recent court decisions tend to look with
less rigor at the "discipline enjoined" requirement. Thus a
New York court stated, in dictum, that in addition to confes-
sions which are enjoined by religious doctrine, voluntary con-
fessions are also included under the minister's privilege.
17 4
172. 183 Minn. at 604-05, 237 N.W. at 591.
173. Id. at 603-05, 237 N.W. at 590-91.
174. In re Fuhrer, 100 Misc.2d 315, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1979).
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The court stated that to come within the protection of theprivilege, the communication must only have been made with
the "purpose of seeking religious counsel, advice, solace, abso-lution or ministration. '' 17' Another court held that the only re-
quirement for the privilege to obtain is that communications
be made with the expectation that they would be confiden-
tial.17 The cases which have denied the privilege have gener-
ally done so because the communication was not made to a
clergyman in his professional character, and not because the
communication failed to satisfy the "discipline enjoined"
requirement.
In analyzing the statutes we find that a majority of stat-
utes do not have a "discipline enjoined" clause, but are con-
tent to require something less than a denominational require-
ment of secrecy for the privilege to obtain. Maine, for
example, requires only that one communicate with a clergy-
man "(2) . . .privately . . ., (b) ...in his professional char-
acter as spiritual advisor."17 Perhaps even more telling is thatArkansas, the state whose courts had rendered the interpreta-
tion of the "discipline enjoined" clause most unfavorable to
the maintenance of the privilege 17 8 has since modified its
statute to obviate that requirement. Arkansas requires only
that "(2) a communication is confidential if made privately
and not intended for further disclosure except to other per-
sons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communica-
tion. 1 7  Even New York, which had the first United States
statute on the privilege-and whose statute served as a modelfor other states-has abandoned the "discipline enjoined" re-quirement."' In addition, the three most recent statutes en-
175. Id. at 320, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (citing United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4(2d Cir. 1972)).
176. State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1980).
177. ME. R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 505 (1982).
178. See Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.W. 353 (1926). See also Alford
v. Johnson, 103 Ark. 236, 146 S.W. 516 (1912).
179. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 505 (1979).
180. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982). The New York stat-
ute now reads: "Unless the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a cler-gyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practi-tioner, shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his
professional character as spiritual advisor."
Mention should here be made of the Texas statute which requires that:
No ordained minister, priest, rabbi or duly accredited Christian Sci-
ence practitioner of an established church or religious organization shall
1983]
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acted on the privilege have all drastically modified this re-
quirement. 81 Also, Alaska and Ohio, both of which had
"discipline enjoined" clauses in their statutes, have recently
amended their statutes and have excluded that clause.1
82
It would seem reasonable to assume that courts-and
state legislatures-do not wish to find themselves in the un-
comfortable position of scrutinizing doctrine to determine
what the discipline of a particular group is. The clause is fall-
ing into gradual disuse, although it cannot be totally disre-
garded. There is no assurance that a future court will not
strictly apply this requirement and require just such scrutiny.
be required to testify in any action, suit, or proceeding, concerning any
information which may have been confidentially communicated to him
in his professional capacity under such circumstances that to disclose
the information would violate a sacred or moral trust, when the giving of
such testimony is objected to by the communicant; provided, however,
that the presiding judge in any trial may compel such disclosure if in
his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice.
(emphasis added).
TEx. REV. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The last clause of this
statute adds a singular and unique provision not present in any other state's clergy
privilege statute. The precise meaning of this clause is unclear as there is no reported
Texas case applying this statute. Yet it would seem that the presiding judge has the
power-subject only to appellate review for abuse of discretion-to compel disclosure
of confidential communications if he believes the proper administration of justice so
requires. Whether a judge would, in fact, apply this statute as an "implied," disci-
pline enjoined clause is uncertain.
One commentator is, nevertheless, fairly optimistic about this statute.
While the legislature has now officially created the privilege it is doubt-
ful that the outcome of any trials is likely to be influenced by the stat-
ute. . . . I know of several instances where the minister stood his
ground and refused to obey the judge's admonition to answer, without
suffering any penalty. No case has been found where a priest or clergy-
man was compelled to disclose communications made in the confes-
sional. It is difficult to imagine an elected judge committing a clergyman
for contempt in refusing to obey an instruction to disclose a confession
made to him.
Ray, Evidence, 22 SW. L.J. 167, 172-73 (1968). Whether this optimism is justified
remains to be seen.
181. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981) (effective August 10, 1979)
requires only that a clergyman "shall not be required to disclose a confession or confi-
dence made to him in his professional character as spiritual adviser." (emphasis
added). In Alabama a communication is confidential when "a person communicatetsJ
with a clergyman in his professional capacity and in a confidential manner." ALA.
CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982) (effective June 7, 1979). Mississippi states that "a
communication is 'confidential' if made privately and not intended for further dis-
closure except in furtherance of the purpose of the communication." Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982) (effective July 1, 1976).
182. ALASKA R. OF CT., R. OF EVID. 506 (1982); Onxo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02
(Page 1981).
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Perhaps only then will its constitutional implications be
decided.
IX. WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE
The minister's privilege protects the minister from forced
disclosure of confidential communications. The question re-
mains whether the privilege belongs to both the minister and
the penitent, or the penitent alone. If a minister refuses to
testify based on religious beliefs and yet the penitent waives
the privilege, may the minister be forced to testify?
The general tenor of statutes conferring other privi-
leges-such as the attorney-client or physician-patient--is
that the privilege does not belong to the attorney or physi-
cian, but rather to the client. Yet there is a valid reason for
reaching a different result in the case of the minister's privi-
lege. Many ministers believe it to be a religious obligation to
maintain the secrecy of penitential communication despite the
willingness of the penitent to allow disclosure.' In addition,
it has been suggested that allowing a clergyman to testify
when a privilege is waived may lead to abuse of that privilege.
The privilege waiver could also be the instrument of
abuse by a scheming, wilful, and debased person. He
could confess a number of different versions to a number
of different priests and then waive the privilege for the
one who best suited his purpose but not waive it for the
priests who would not serve his purpose.""
The statutes of the various states do indeed resolve this
question in different ways. In California, the minister's privi-
lege is actually two separate privileges, one belonging to the
priest"" and the other to the penitent. 86 New Hampshire,
however, grants the privilege only if "the person confessing or
confiding [does not] waive the privilege.'1 7 These statutes il-
lustrate the dichotomous ways this issue is resolved in various
states. As the states are roughly evenly divided on the ques-
183. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
184. Reese, supra note 45, at 85.
185. "[A] penitent, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he claims the
privilege." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1966).
186. "[A] clergyman, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose
a penitential communication if he claims the privilege." Id. at § 1034.
187. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1981).
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tion, no general statement can be made as to who holds the
privilege. Rather, the statutes must be consulted.
Ohio's statute, unusual in this regard, states "[T]he cler-
gyman, rabbi, priest, or minister may testify by express con-
sent of the person making the communication, except when
the disclosure of the information is in violation of his sacred
trust."'188 Thus Ohio allows the minister to claim the privilege
even if waived by the penitent, if the minister would violate a
sacred trust by testifying. This seems to be a compromise po-
sition, which may represent the fairest answer to the problem
from the point of view of the clergyman.
The issue of waiver is further complicated in those states
which vest the right to assert the privilege solely in the peni-
tent where the privilege is asserted by one spouse but not the
other, and both have engaged in joint marital counseling with
a minister. Assuming the clergyman has no religious restric-
tion on revealing communications on which the privilege has
been waived, what is he to do? Will the court hold him bound
by the waiver? Or is he bound by the spouse still asserting the
privilege? Again the answer is unclear. The Delaware statute
specifically addresses this problem. It reads: "No priest...
shall be examined . . .(3) [W]ith respect to any communica-
tion made to him, in his professional capacity, by either
spouse, in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged
spouses, without the consent of the spouse making the com-
munication."'189 In states which have not been so explicit in
delineating the spousal waiver provisions, it is left to the
courts to determine the exact parameters of the privilege. One
state has gone so far as to extend the privilege to allow one
spouse to prohibit not only the clergyman but the other
spouse as well from disclosing "in any legal or quasi-legal pro-
ceeding, . . . anything said by either party during such com-
munication."190 This is a clear minority position but may in
fact indicate a trend to give greater protection to communica-
tion with a clergyman. 91
188. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1981).
189. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4316 (1975) (emphasis added), repealed by DEL.
R. oF CT., R. OF EvID. 505 (1981) (this new rule is modeled after the Uniform Rules of
Evidence).
190. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
191. Note also that the Alabama statute delineates that the privilege applies in
"legal or quasi legal proceeding." Id. This is defined in a previous part of that same
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X. THE PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Thus far, this article has considered the application of the
minister's privilege in state courts. It remains, therefore, to
consider whether the privilege would apply in federal courts.
On February 6, 1959 Senator Keating of New York introduced
S 965, designed to afford a privilege to clergymen testifying in
federal courts and before Congress. He proposed amending
the United States Code to include the following provision:
1826. Privilege of clergymen and news reporters.
(1) A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall
not be allowed in any court of the United States to dis-
close a confession made to him, in his professional charac-
ter, in the course of discipline, enjoined by the rules or
practice of the religious body to which he belongs.10 2
The bill, however, died in committee.' 83 Similar bills were also
introduced in the House on January 27, 1959, but no action
was taken on those bills either."4
The clergyman's privilege was first recognized in the fed-
eral courts in 1875.11a The Supreme Court, in dictum, stated
that there is a general principal that "public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which 'the
law itself regards as confidential .. ". " The Court found
that a suit could not be maintained which "would require a
disclosure of the confidences of the confessional . . . ."
Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
one writer concluded:
statute as "[A]ny proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court, whether a court of re-
cord, a grand jury investigation, a coroner's inquest and any proceeding or hearing
before any public officer or administrative agency of the state or any political subdivi-
sion thereof." Id. This is not typical, as most statutes do not clearly indicate in what
type of proceeding the privilege can be asserted. Minimally, the privilege applies to
both criminal as well as civil cases before trial courts. However, in those states which
do not list the specific types of legal proceedings to which the privilege applies, the
extent of the privilege cannot be specifically determined. Since the privilege statutes
are invariably in the parts of the code dealing with evidence, presumptively the privi-
lege would have as broad or as narrow an application as the evidence code does. See
Reese, supra note 45, at 73-74.
192. W. TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 114.
193. Id. at 115.
194. Id.
195. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
196. Id. at 107.
197. Id.
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A federal court testing the constitutionality of the priest-
penitent privilege probably would be testing a privilege
created by a state. The federal court in any civil action
probably will be required to adopt a state statutory
priest-penitent privilege or will treat any relevant state
grant of the privilege as substantive rather than procedu-
ral and therefore probably will adopt a state privilege
under the Erie doctrine.1"8
The proposed federal rules of evidence included a specific pro-
vision for the minister's privilege. That section provided in
part:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, or an
individual reasonably believed so to be by the person con-
sulting him ...
(b) . . .A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent another from disclosing a confidential commu-
nication by the person to a clergyman in his professional
character as spiritual advisor.1"
Rule 506, however, was deleted when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were finally adopted. Instead, Rule 501 was adopted
which provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and pro-
ceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or polit-
ical subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.200
Thus the federal courts, at least in civil actions, would be ap-
plying the state privilege statutes where an element of the
claim or defense is determined by state law. In cases, however,
where a federal privilege is involved the privilege at common
law should be interpreted "in light of reason and experi-
198. Stoyles, supra note 7, at 29-30.
199. PROP. FED. R. EvID. 506, 51 F.R.D. 315, 371 (1971).
200. FED. R. EvID. 501, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1975).
[Vol. 23
CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
ence."2 1 In interpreting this standard the court in Mullen v.
United States02 considered Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (which contains the same language as the
Federal Rules of Evidence, e.g., privileges should be "inter-
preted in light of reason and experience") and concluded that
reason and experience call for recognition of the minister's
privilege. A similar result was reached in In Re Verplank,05
where the court considered the claims of the clergy privilege
in the light of Rule 26 and of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and concluded that the privilege should apply.204
One factor which needs to be considered in evaluating
Verplank is that the court placed some significance on the
fact that proposed Rule 506 contained a provision for clergy
privilege. However, the Verplank decision was handed down
before the rejection of proposed Rule 506 and the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is thus possible that a fed-
eral court today-after rejection of Rule 506-might not find
the privilege to apply. Yet this result is not likely because the
Mullen and Verplank courts found the privilege to exist
chiefly on the basis of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Both courts found the "light of reason and ex-
perience" dictates upholding the privilege. It therefore seems
clear that the minister's privilege should apply in federal
courts as well.2 5
201. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1980).
202. 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
203. 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
204. Id. at 435.
205. United States military courts also recognize a clergy privilege as is stated
in the manual for court martial:
A privileged communication is a communication made as an inci-
dent of a confidential relation which it is the public policy to protect.
Since public policy is involved, evidence of such a communication
should not be received unless it appears that the privilege has been
waived by the person or government entitled to the benefit of it or that
the evidence comes from a person or source not bound by the privilege.
b. CERTAIN PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS...
(2) Communications between . . . penitent and clergyman. . . . Also
privileged are communications between a person and a chaplain, priest,
or clergyman, or assistant or other agent thereof, of any denomination
made in the relationship of penitent and chaplain, priest or clergyman,
either as a formal act of religion or concerning a matter of conscience
• . . the person entitled to the benefit of the penitent and clergyman
privilege is the penitent. A communication made . . . by a penitent to a
clergyman is not within these privileges if it was made intending that it
be passed on to someone outside the privileged relationship, nor is a
1983]
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XI. THE LIMITS OF THE PRIVILEGE
There are few privileges that are absolute. A privilege,
whether it be attorney-client or physician-patient, is afforded
to a witness on the theory that the benefit to society is greater
in allowing him not to testify. The attorney-client privilege,
for example, does not give the attorney the right to protect or
conceal intent to commit a crime.' 0 Thus the law balances the
harm which accrues to society by excluding potentially helpful
testimony against the benefits of so doing. Where the scale
tips in favor of exclusion, a privilege is recognized2 07 It is,
however, recognized that certain factors, when present, re-
quire that the privilege not apply. It is therefore necessary to
consider whether there are circumstances that would mitigate
against recognizing the minister's privilege.
Would the privilege be held to apply where a minister be-
comes aware, in a confidential communication from a peni-
tent, of threatened harm? Is there a duty imposed by law on
clergymen to reveal privileged communication in order to
avoid harm to innocent parties? There are no recorded deci-
sions considering these issues, and thus it is prudent to ex-
amine other privileges to attempt to understand how a court
would rule on the minister's privilege in such circumstances.
Wigmore suggests four conditions that should be consid-
ered to determine whether a class of communication should be
privileged. 08 At common law the attorney-client and hus-
band-wife privileges were recognized-others were not. Yet
communication between ... penitent and clergyman within these privi-
leges if to the knowledge of the ... penitent it was made in the pres-
ence of someone outside the privileged relationship capable of under-
standing the communication. A person interpreting the communication
as the agent of either party thereto and an agent of the ... clergyman
is not outside the privileged relationship.
MANUAL FOR COURT-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Article 151 (rev. ed. 1969). An excerpt
from the Air Force regulations gives a good view of how the individual services have
interpreted the above statute:
The disclosure of a privileged communication between penitent and
clergyman (chaplain) should not be required or permitted unless the
person who is entitled to the benefit of the privilege consents to the
disclosure of the communication or has otherwise waived the privilege.
Air Force Regulation 265-1, sec. 6, para. 126, quoted in Jones, supra note 8, at 62.
206. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 4-101(c)(3) (1974).
207. See 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2394, at 878 (McNaughten rev.
1961).
208. Id. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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state legislatures have considered other situations and have
decided that other relationships are also worthy of wearing
the mantle of confidentiality. Examples of other privileged re-
lationships are those of the physician-patient and psychother-
apist-patient.209 There are, however, situations where societal
interest dictates that the privilege not apply.
The California Supreme Court in the landmark case
Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the University of Califor-
nia'10 considered whether a psychotherapist had a duty to dis-
close a patient's statements which threatened a third person.
Relying on California Evidence Code § 1024,11 the court
stated:
[W]e recognize the public interest in supporting effective
treatment of mental illness and in protecting the rights of
patients to privacy (citations omitted), and the conse-
quent public importance of safeguarding the confidential
character of psychotherapeutic communication. Against
this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest
in safety from violent assault.""2
The court concluded that the psychotherapist privilege should
not there be recognized.
The public policy favoring protection of the confidential
character of patient-psychotherapist communications
must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to
avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends
where the public peril begins.
Our current crowded and computerized society com-
pels the interdependence of its members. In this risk-in-
fested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure
209. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West Supp. 1982) which states that a "patient
... has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing a
confidential communication between patient and physician. . .. ". See also CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1982) which states that a "patient, . . . has a privilege to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent another form disclosing, a confidential communica-
tion between patient and psychotherapist .. " Note, the California Supreme Courtin Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), equated the lack of privilege with the psychothera-
pists' duty to reveal the communication. Thus it may be stated with some certainty
that if a certain communication would be held unprivileged-because it presented a
threat of harm to a third person-then that clergyman would have a duty to reveal
that communication.
210. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
211. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
212. 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
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to danger that would result from a concealed knowledge
of the therapist that his patient was lethal. If the exercise
of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim re-
quires the therapist to warn the endangered party or
those who can reasonably be expected to notify him, we
see no sufficient societal interest that would protect and
justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in
the public interest.""8
It would seem therefore that the clergy privilege should be
similarly limited. A clergyman should, like the psychiatrist in
Tarasoff, be required to disclose confidential communications
when harm to innocent parties is threatened and imminent.
The same societal considerations that dictated non-recogni-
tion of the privilege. in Tarasoff, would reasonably dictate its
denial where a clergyman is involved. Yet the California legis-
lature did enact section 1024214 which specifically denies the
privilege to a psychotherapist in those circumstances where
there is a threat of harm to another. Significantly, as has been
previously stated here, the Tarasoff court relied heavily on
that statute in denying confidentiality. There is, however, no
equivalent provision in the California code dealing with the
clergy privilege. No exception is listed which denies a clergy-
man the privilege where harm is threatened. Thus-while one
could predict, based on Tarasoff, that a privilege would be de-
nied in such circumstances-it is possible the court would
conclude the absence of an express statutory exclusion for the
213. Id. This argument has even more force when one realizes that psychoanal-
ysis and pastoral counseling share many similarities. Thus it has been written that
"the Roman Catholic Church is beginning to suspect a certain 'rivalry' between the
practice of psychoanalysis and that of confession. The authorities of that Church
have thought it wise to issue certain warnings." E. GERGGREN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONFESSION 16 (1975).
Another writer, in comparing the healing effects of the military chaplain with the
psychologist has stated that:
An effort has frequently been made at "team ministry" or "team heal-
ing". Recognizing that there are the psychological, biological, and spiri-
tual sides to people, hospitals are often employing chaplains and psy-
chologists to work side by side. Industries are beginning to do the same.
The military chaplains and psychologists no longer see themselves as
part of separate "corps" to whom people may run in times of crises, but
as significant contributors to a healthy lifestyle of individuals within the
structured military society.
Jones, Privileged Communication and the Military Chaplain: Some Ethical Consid-
erations, 1 CHAPLAINCY 15, 18 (1978).
214. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
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clergy privilege indicates the legislature intended the privilege
to apply even when harm is threatened.
It may also be instructive to examine another leading case
dealing with the psychotherapist's right of confidentiality. In
McIntosh v. Milano, " the court considered the obligation of
a psychotherapist to reveal confidential communication to the
potential victim of threatened harm. It concluded that there is
a duty of disclosure if an imminent danger to the patient or
society exists. In such a case "considerations of confidentiality
have no over-riding influence ... ,,"16 The court relied on an
article by a leading psychiatrist, the implications of which
bear heavily on the question of whether a clergyman would be
faced with a similar duty.
In an article by Dr. Eric A. Plaut, "A Perspective on
Confidentiality," he specifically states that the confiden-
tial privilege of a psychiatrist is not total. He compares
the situation of the psychiatrist and the patient with the
priest-penitent relationship and distinguishes them on
the basis of an interesting correlation with "civil
authority":
"As the Watergate incident has demonstrated, there
is no such thing as total confidentiality under American
Law, not even under executive privilege. However, the
courts have traditionally been extremely reluctant to have
a priest divulge material from the confessional. This
priest-penitent relationship has not been subject to the
large number of limitations placed the confidentiality of
the psychiatrist-patient relationship. Underlying this dis-
tinction is the separation of church and state specified in
the Constitution. With the interesting exception of the
marriage ceremony, the clergyman has no civil authority
whatever. It is this absence of civil authority which al-
lows for the almost total confidentiality of the priest-
penitent relationship. Conversely, psychiatrists have ex-
tensive civil authority, e.g., in circumstances involving
abortions, personal injury suits, commitment procedures,
and not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity pleas. So long as we
retain civil authority, our claim to confidentiality will al-
ways be subject to compromise. 21 7
If courts are guided in the future by the Dr. Plaut's the-
215. 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
216. Id. at 493, 403 A.2d at 513.
217. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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ory, then it would seem that the clergyman who lacks "civil
authority" would not be required to disclose confidential com-
munication where harm is threatened.
Examination of the doctrine of representative denomina-
tions indicates that some do recognize exceptions to the privi-
lege while at least one may not. The Lutheran Church states
in its By-Laws that:
No minister of the Lutheran Church in America shall di-
vulge any confidential disclosure given to him in the
course of his care of souls or otherwise in his professional
capacity . .. except with the express permission of the
person who had confided to him or in order to prevent
the commission of a crime.21 8
The College of Chaplains in its Code of Ethics states that its
members must observe the "seal of confession" without any
exception 2 19 That same code, however, states that "confiden-
tial information is only to be revealed when it is assumed that
greater health for individuals can be achieved by such revela-
tion.220 Similarly, American Baptist policy recognizes that
confidentiality is not absolute-but may be abridged when
"conscience so reqjxires. ' 221
The Catholic Church position seems less flexible:
The seal of confession must always be meticulously safe-
guarded and observed in regard to all matters that come
under it. The law of the seal admits of no excusation. No
cause, however great, whatever the circumstances, will
218. By-Laws of the Lutheran Church of America, quoted in Jones, supra note
213, at 15.
219. College of Chaplains, Code of Ethics (1976), quoted in Jones, supra note
213, at 21.
220. Id. The implications of this statement go beyond anything the writer has
suggested heretofore. It seems that the provision allowing (requiring?) disclosure of
confidential communications, "when greater health for individuals can be achieved by
such revelation," means more than merely allowing disclosure when the client threat-
ens harm. Perhaps a clergyman, hearing a private confession of immoral and unlawful
activity, would conclude that punishment-and even imprisonment-would "help"
the confessor by allowing him to expiate his guilt and atone for his sins. If the term
"greater health" is to be taken at face value, it would seem that a clergyman in such a
situation would be permitted (and perhaps even required) to reveal the contents of
that confession to the authorities. Such a result would be truly anomalous and cer-
tainly wrench the meaning of "confidential communications."
221. Interview with Professor Douglas Sharp of the American Baptist Seminary
of the West (May 4, 1982).
[Vol. 23
CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
justify its violation. The seal is inviolable .... 2
However, even the Catholic Church recognizes that a profes-
sional secret-as opposed to that uttered under the seal of
confession-should be revealed in certain circumstances: "The
common teaching of the moralists is that the obligation of
professional secrecy ceases whenever this measure is urgently
necessary for warding off a serious evil (damnum grave) from
the common welfare.2 2 It therefore seems that Catholic doc-
trine would not permit the revealing of information gained in
the confessional, under any circumstances-even in order to
prevent harm to third persons. However, that which is told to
a priest outside the confessional-but still with the expecta-
tion of "professional secrecy" would not be privileged in like
circumstances.
It is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on the limit of the
clergy privilege. There are factors, such as the calculus of the
societal benefit-harm approach, which dictate that the clergy
privilege be treated similarly to other professional privi-
leges-like the psychotherapist's privilege-and thus be de-
nied where harm is threatened to a third person. There are
other factors, however, which differentiate the clergy privilege
from the other privileges.2 24
In fact many denominations would concur that in such a
case the confidence should be broken. Yet for Catholic priests
at least, it would seem that information garnered in the con-
fessional may never be released. Would a court require a
priest to disclose such communication? Would he, or any
other clergyman, be held liable in tort for not disclosing such
communication to a third party who is later attacked by the
penitent? It appears that the societal harm-benefit analysis
suggests that a clergyman would have a duty to reveal privi-
leged communications in such circumstances. Yet the defini-
tive answer must await further judicial pronouncement.2 25 It is
222. 4 NEW CATH. ENCY. 135 (1967) (emphasis added).
223. Regan and McCartney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communica-
tions, 2 CATH. LAW. 3, 8 (1956).
224. Examples are: (1) The "civil authority" distinction discussed supra notes
216-17 and accompanying text, (2) Most physician and psychotherapist privileges
have statutory exceptions where a realistic and imminent threat of harm as to third
persons are made to the former; see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966), and (3)
The clergy privilege may involve the restrictions of the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise clauses, while the other privileges clearly do not.
225. Also remaining to be considered are the related questions of whether the
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not suggested that a cleryman be required to disclose all
threats of harm to third persons. Rather what is considered is
whether, when a clergyman is of the firm belief that a peni-
tent who threatens harm has the means and intent to effect
his designs, he must reveal that communication.
XII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Counseling-the giving of advice and comfort to religious
adherents-is a common and accepted practice of virtually all
faiths and denominations. The clergyman is often the one to
whom an individual, burdened by feelings of guilt and re-
morse, can turn to for comfort and spiritual strength. As one
writer has said, pastoral counseling is a process of confession,
which leads to benefits both for the penitent and society:
"Much pastoral counseling involves processes that could prop-
erly be called confession, leading toward processes that could
be called forgiveness, reconciliation or absolution. '2  Clergy-
men are often the last resort for troubled individuals whose
financial limitations may prevent them from seeking psychiat-
ric or psychotherapeutic assistance. The clergyman is as avail-
able as the nearest church, or synagogue, and will generally
not ask an individual whether his health insurance is in order
before undertaking counseling. Further, many individuals will
feel comfortable discussing intimate problems with a minister,
rabbi, or priest with whom they have a relationship, while
they may be reticent to "bare their souls" to a stran-
ger-though he may be a licensed psychiatrist. The clergy-
penitent relationship therefore should be encouraged, and the
confidentiality of that relationship should be insured. It is
with this perspective that the following specific recommenda-
tions are made.
Marital counseling is an important and vital part of a
minister's role. The basic family structure is being eroded by
privilege would apply in the following circumstances: (1) Where during the course of
the interview the penitent threatens the clergyman and (2) where the penitent threat-
ens harm to himself (e.g., a threat of suicide). Must the clergyman keep such state-
ments confidential? In the first situation it would seem that the same result would
obtain where a third party was threatened, since there is no solid reason to favor the
life of a third party over that of the clergyman. In the second case, however, a differ-
ent result may be suggested, since here the societal harm-benefit calculus is different,
and there is no threat to innocent third parties.
226. Reese, supra note 45, at 84 n.101 (quoting R. E. Elliot, Guilt and Forgive-
ness, Perkins School of Theology).
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many factors, including the pressures and rigors of modern so-
ciety. The preservation of that structure is important to the
continued vitality of American society. A couple having diffi-
culty in their marriage will often consult their minister and
seek his experience and guidance to ameliorate their situation.
Yet this can only be assured when each party knows that his
or her most intimate discussions will be kept confidential. In
some instances acts which are considered criminal offenses by
the state are revealed.2 27
It is therefore essential that the right to confidentiality in
marriage counseling be recognized. A model for the protection
of confidentiality of marital counseling could be the former
Delaware statute which reads:
No priest, clergyman, rabbi, practitioner of Christian Sci-
ence, or other duly licensed, ordained or consecrated min-
ister of any religion shall be examined in any civil or
criminal proceedings in the courts of this state:
... (3) With respect to any communication made to him
in his professional capacity, by either spouse, in connec-
tion with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses, with-
out the consent of the spouse making the
communication.2 28
All states should adopt this formulation and extend the privi-
lege to marital counseling, for, as previously indicated, it is in
society's best interest to do so.
Many states have the "traditional" wording requiring a
confession be made to a clergyman in his professional capac-
ity in the course of discipline enjoined by the rule and prac-
tice of the religious body to which he belongs. Most modern
statutes, however, have deleted the "discipline enjoined" re-
quirement and have instead used terminology such as "in a
confidential manner (1) to make a confession, (2) to seek spir-
itual counsel or comfort or (3) to enlist help or advice in con-
nection with a marital problem, ' 2 9 or prohibit disclosure of a
confession or confidence "made to him in his professional
character as spiritual advisor."' 0 The requirement that the
communication be made to a clergyman in his professional ca-
227. W. TIEMANN, supra note 10, at 122.
228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4316 (1975), repealed by DEL. R. ov CT., R. OF
EVID. 505 (1981).
229. ALA. CODE § 12-21-177 (Supp. 1982).
230. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
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pacity is sound and should be retained. Anything less may
lead to unwarranted abuses. There is little to commend al-
lowing the privilege where one speaks to a minister as a
friend, say at a picnic or sports event, without intending that
the clergyman listen or respond as a religious functionary.
That requirement is thus justified. The same, however, cannot
be said of the "discipline enjoined" requirement.
The courts should not involve themselves in the doctrine
and polity of various religious groups to determine the exact
parameters of each discipline. Aside from the potential consti-
tutional difficulties involved in such analyses, the statutes
should properly take notice-as did the court in Swen-
son2 3-that the sharing of confidences with a minister is a
legitimate and common practice of all churches and religious
denominations. It is not the function of the legislature to scru-
tinize the tenets of religious groups to determine its specific
sacraments and doctrines. Whether one's religious denomina-
tion so requires, or whether a clergyman is bound by the for-
mal dictates of his church to protect that confidence, is irrele-
vant. It is in the interests of society to foster open and free
communications between penitent and clergyman. The confi-
dentiality of that relationship should still be protected.
It is also worthwhile to consider the presence of third per-
sons and its effect on the privilege. Generally the presence of
third parties essential to the communications does not void
the privilege. Also, those third parties may claim the privilege
in their own right. However, an express provision to that ef-
fect may serve a useful purpose. The Mississippi statute adds
the provision that "(4) A clergyman's secretary, stenographer
or clerk shall not be examined without the consent of the cler-
gyman concerning any fact, the knowledge of which was ac-
quired in such capacity."' ' 2 This provision resolves a potential
* problem and should be preserved. In order to avoid any ambi-
guity it would, however, be helpful to supplement the above
provision, with the stipulation that this section would not ap-
ply where the clergyman dies or becomes mentally
incapacitated.8
Another factor that needs to be addressed is the require-
231. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
232. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1982).
233. This recommended stipulation would avoid the potential problem where
the clergyman's consent could not be given because of his death or mental incapacity.
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ment of "communication" itself. Must it be oral? Must it be
in person? One court has held that the privilege did not apply
to a letter sent to a minister asking for "prayers.118 4 Yet it is
possible that one may feel so guilt-ridden and abashed about
an act committed that one would not communicate face-to-
face with a minister but rather write a letter. Are there not
the same benefits to society from a written confession as an
oral one? What of a "confession of sin" over the telephone?
Perhaps one is ill and confined to a hospital bed and tele-
phones his clergyman. This may very well be the time when
one needs spiritual guidance the most. Does that not also de-
serve the protection of confidentiality? Observations of a cler-
gyman should also be privileged. One court has indicated by
implication that only communication to a clergyman is privi-
leged-and not observations by a clergyman in the course of
that communication.2 "8 That would seem to be an anomalous
and unreasoned result. The act of spiritual guidance and com-
fort must be unfettered by such an artificial distinction. Often
the tone of voice or movement of hands may better express
the penitent's feelings than words spoken. A rule dictating
that clergymen not be questioned as to the contents of the
communication but allowing questions about their observa-
tions would be unreasonable.
Written records of a clergyman may also frequently con-
tain the results of confidential communications or relevant
suggestions by that clergyman to deal with the penitent's
problem. Making public such records might cause serious
damage to the penitent and might prevent others from seek-
ing help for fear they too will not be protected. Such records
should remain privileged.
It is therefore recommended that the model statute in-
clude a provision which protects (1) any form of communica-
tion directed to a clergyman in his professional capacity
whether that be by telephone, telecommunication, letter or
any other means of communication; (2) all observations of
clergymen made during the course of any privileged communi-
cation (defined elsewhere); and (3) all records relating to con-
fidential communications made in the course of or as a result
of confidential communication.
234. Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.W. 353 (1926).
235. Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 6 N.W.2d 401 (1942).
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The definition of clergyman is a difficult matter. Perhaps
the most effective way to recommend a model statute is to
analyze what it should not be. Kansas gives the privilege to a
"duly ordained regular minister of religion." Duly ordained
minister of religion is defined as:
(a)(1) person who has been ordained, in accordance with
the ceremonial ritual, or discipline of a church, religious
sect, or organization established on the basis of a commu-
nity of faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a reli-
gious character, to preach and to teach the doctrines of
such church, sect, or organization and to administer the
rites and ceremonies thereof in public worship, and who
as his or her regular and customary vocation preaches and
teaches the principles of religion and administers the or-
dinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or
principles of such church, sect, or organization .... 236
Further, "regular minister or religion" is defined as:
(2) [O]ne who as his or her customary vocation preaches
and teaches the principles of religion of a church, a reli-
gious sect, or organization of which he or she is a member,
without having been formally ordained as a minister of
religion, and who is recognized by such church, sect, or
organization as a regular minister; (3) the term "regular
or duly ordained minister of religion" does not include a
person who irregularly or incidentally preaches and
teaches the principles of religion of a church, religious
sect, or organization and does not include any person who
may have been duly ordained a minister in accordance
with the ceremonial rite, or discipline of a church, reli-
gious sect or organization, but who does not regularly, as
a vocation, teach and preach the principles of religion and
administer the ordinances of public worship as embodied
in the creed or principles of his or her church, sect, or
organization .... 8
This is unsatisfactory in many ways. First, it requires
that the minister have as his "regular and customary voca-
tion" the preaching and teaching of religion. Presumably this
would exclude any part-time minister. In addition, ordained
faculty members of seminaries may not be included. What
about full-time hospital chaplains? Or military chaplains?




Many churches, which are too large to be effectively guided by
one pastor, frequently hire a retired minister to assist the reg-
ular minister. This retired clergyman does all the tasks of a
clergyman-yet he only works part-time. The policies behind
the privilege suggest no reason why the above mentioned per-
sons should be excluded from its protection.
Even more noteworthy is the fact that some denomina-
tions (e.g., Christian Science and the Church of Jesus Christ
of the Latter Day Saints) dictate that, with few exceptions,
their clergy not be full-time. They too should not be excluded.
Therefore, a statute which defines clergymen as does the Kan-
sas statute should be avoided.
The denominational identification of the clergyman also
poses problems. Georgia, for example, limits its statutes to
"any Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to any priest of the
Roman Catholic faith, or to any priest of the Greek Orthodox
Catholic faith, or to any Jewish Rabbi, or to any Christian or
Jewish minister, by whatever name called .... ,, s This is un-
satisfactory since communication with a Buddhist monk, a
Moslem priest or even perhaps a Unitarian minister would not
be privileged. While Georgia was probably trying to deal
with-and exclude-the "mail-order minister," i.e., the al-
leged fraudulent clergyman, the solution may in fact create
more problems than it solves.
Connecticut's statute affords the privilege to "a clergy-
man, priest, minister, rabbi, or practitioner of any religious
denomination accredited by the religious body to which he be-
longs who is settled in the work of the ministry. 23 9 What does
settled in the work of the ministry mean? Again, is a part-
time or retired minister covered? Such formulations are
equally unsatisfactory.
Is there an age requirement for ministers? Tennessee and
Virginia establish the age of eighteen while other states do
not. There are some denominations which have child evange-
lists below these ages, and presumably, since there is no basis
for exception noted, they would be excluded. This properly
should be a question for the church involved. In those
churches where one is ordained at an earlier age, the privilege
should exist as to such an individual as well. It is therefore
238. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
239. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West Supp. 1982).
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recommended that a privilege statute should not impose any
limitation on clergymen (1) who practice their calling on less
than a full-time basis, or (2) who are less than a specified age.
It is not suggested that the privilege be extended to all
those who are self-ordained. Pennsylvania's statute (since re-
pealed) provided that communications to all clergy were privi-
leged "except clergymen or ministers who are self-ordained or
who are members of religious organizations in which members
other than the leader thereof are deemed clergymen.""" On
its face the statute sets forth a requirement of formal ordina-
tion. Yet the penitent should be allowed confidentiality when
he speaks to one who acts or is recognized as a minister al-
though he may not be formally ordained. Thus, if a church or
religious community recognizes a person as their leader and
pastor, then he should be allowed the privilege, even if not
formally ordained. 41
The definition of "penitent" also needs to be elucidated.
The Kansas statute defines a penitent entitled to claim the
privilege as:
(a)(1) person who recognizes the existence and authority
of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly
ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in deter-
mining or discharging his or her moral obligations, or in
obtaining God's mercy or forgiveness for past culpable
conduct.242
The Uniform Rules of Evidence in Rule 29(b) provides that:
"'penitent' means a member of a church or religious denomi-
nation who had made a penitential communication to a priest
thereof. . . ." These definitions of penitent are unsatisfac-
tory. Is not an agnostic entitled to benefit from a minister's
spiritual counseling? Should one be required to recognize "the
existence and authority of God" to seek confidential guidance
from a religious leader?
The requirement that the penitent be a member of the
denomination whose religious leader he consults for the com-
munication to be confidential may lead to undesirable results.
240. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 331 (Purdon 1959) (repealed 1978).
241. There are denominations which will recognize a person as a minister even
without formal ordination, if a particular congregation so designates him by consen-
sus. An example is the Unitarian Church. Interview with Bob Lehman, minister of
the First Unitarian Church, San Jose, California (May 4, 1982).
242. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976).
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A person may move to a new home in a different city, not yet
be a member of any Church or Synagogue, and seek spiritual
counseling from a local pastor. Or a Methodist may be un-
happy with the advice of his pastor and decide to go to the
local Baptist minister who has an excellent reputation for ef-
fective counseling. Should the aforementioned people not en-
joy the privilege merely because they are not members of the
minister's church?
Such a definition of "penitent" is unsatisfactory for it ex-
cludes from the mantle of confidentiality many situations that
should be privileged. It is recommended that anyone who con-
sults a minister in his professional capacity be entitled to
claim the privilege.
In addition, the Texas provision that a judge may deny
the privilege where the interests of justice so require is also
unsatisfactory since it vests too much discretion in the
judge.43 It also seems likely that it would often be impossible
for the judge to determine whether the interests of justice dic-
tate disclosure unless the contents of the communication were
first revealed to the judge. This would destroy the necessary
confidentiality of the clergy-penitent relationship.
In light of the above considerations and recommendations
the following model statute is recommended for adoption in
all jurisdictions:
No Clergyman shall be examined in any civil or crim-
inal proceeding, or administrative hearing with respect to
any communication made to that clergyman in his profes-
sional capacity:
(1) "Clergyman" is a spiritual leader in any faith so
recognized by his denomination.
(2) "Communication" includes any manner or form of
communication such as, but not limited to, letter or tele-
phone. Observation and records of any "communication"
shall also be included.
(3) A Clergyman's secretary, stenographer, clerk or
any other person necessary to effect the purpose of the
communication shall not be examined without the Clergy-
man's consent. The provision of this paragraph shall not
apply should (1) the Clergyman die or become mentally
incapacitated, and (2) the person making the communica-
tion consents to such examination.
243. TEx. REv. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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(4) Both the persons making the communication and
the Clergyman shall be holders of the privilege of this
section.
(5) If the communication threatens harm to any per-
son, the Clergyman may, but is not required to disclose
the communication to avoid occurrence of that harm.
Such a statute would minimize constitutional objections
while protecting the vital societal interests of the clergy-peni-
tent relationship.
